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LEGISLATIVE RETROACTIVITY
JAN G. LAITOS* j
Whenever a new law affects either past legal relationships or
decisions made by private parties in reliance on prior law, the
question of prospective or retroactive application of the new law
becomes significant. If the new law is to apply retroactively, it may
affect previously-established rights or legal relationships. The new
retroactive law may alter pre-existing legal arrangements beginning
with the effective date of the new law, or it may relate back to the
original date of creation of legal relationships arising under prior law.
Retroactive application of a new law may also attach legal
consequences to decisions made by private parties who did not
anticipate these consequences at the time the decision was made.
These new legal consequences may take effect on the date of the new
law, or they may apply backwards to the time of the original decision.
Such retroactivity can profoundly affect the plans and expectations of
private parties.
The United States Supreme Court has been aware of, and sensitive
to, the significance of retroactivity. Between 1988 and 1997, the
Court has considered virtually all of the paradigmatic retroactivity
issues involving legislatures,' courts,2 and administrative agencies?
* John A. Carver, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
I. In 1994, the Court decided that statutes should have presumptively prospective effect
in the absence of legislative guidance to the contrary. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 265-73 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994). Landgraf
concluded that this presumption against statutory retroactivity exists even when the conduct
preceding the new statute has resulted in a judicial case "pending" on appeal on the effective
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date of the new statute. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263-65.
The Landgrafpresumption is limited to statutes altering substantive rights. See id. at 271-
73. It does not apply to changes characterized as procedural, see id. at 275, jurisdictional, see id.
at 274, or remedial. See id. at 285 n.37. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer,
117 S. Ct. 1871, 1878 (1997), the Court clarified that jurisdictional statutes address which
courts shall have jurisdiction to hear a cause of action, while non-jurisdictional statutes
determine whether a suit may be brought at all.
Other Supreme Court decisions have considered the extent to which Congress may
retroactively alter the results reached in a litigation context. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
the Court found a separation of powers impediment to congressional attempts to reopen final
court judgments. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). Plaut addressed a different kind of retroactivity than
that at issue in Landgraf. Landgrafpresumed prospectivity to avoid construing a new law that
otherwise might have attached new [post-enactment] legal consequences "to events completed"
before the law's enactment. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 258-59. This means that the statute in
Landgraf altered the legal consequences of past private actions only in the future. Plaut
considered a statute which altered thepast legal consequences of past private actions. The Court
in Plaut erected a barrier to retroactive legislation that "prescribes what the law was at an earlier
time." Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1456.
In the context of tax legislation, however, Congress may prescribe what the law was at an
earlier time if it so intends. In United States v. Carlton, the Court decided that due process was
not violated by an amendment to a federal tax statute that imposed a retroactive tax liability on
pre-amendment transactions. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
The Supreme Court recently resolved important issues about the relationship between new
legislation and rules announced previous judicial decisions. Both Plaut and Rivers permit
Congress to alter rules of law established by judicial decision (i.e., to "legislatively overrule" a
case), even decisions by the Supreme Court. See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1457; Rivers, 511 U.S. at
304-05 & n.5. Plaut also established that Congress may decide to announce a new law that
operates retroactively to govern the rights of parties whose rights would otherwise be subject to
a rule announced in an appealable judicial decision. See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1457
(acknowledging "the distinction between judgments from which all appeals have been forgone
or completed, and judgments that remain on appeal (or subject to being apealed)"). If Congress
wishes to change the law for pending cases that are not yet final, it must make clear its intent.
See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270-73. Once Congress has signaled its intent, it may change the
result of a pending case by changing the law underlying the legal basis of the pending suits. See
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
In 1993 the Court was presented with the question of whether a legislative body may
change the statutory language underlying a governmental contract, thereby retroactively
changing the contract itself. See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10 (1993). The
Court left unresolved this significant retroactivity issue when it interpreted the contract as not
prohibiting the changes contemplated by the subsequent statute. See id. at 17-21. However, in
1996 the Court concluded that the government may be liable for damages resulting from
retroactive contract breaches where the contract allocates the risk of regulatory change to the
government. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
2. In 1993 the Court considered whether there should be a different rule for retroactivity
when a court case is changed not by the legislature, but by a subsequent court case. See Harper
v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993). The Court concluded that when a court in a
civil context reverses judicial precedent and applies a new rule of federal law to the parties
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These cases indicate that the Court has revised its thinking about the
nature and legal effect of retroactivity, particularly legislative
retroactivity. Lower court cases also seem to confirm that judicial
review of retroactive lawmaking has undergone a change in recent
years.4 This developing body of law from the Supreme Court and
lower courts has, in the past decade, basically reconstructed the
jurisprudence of retroactivity.
Surprisingly, other than a few important (and frequently cited)
articles written years ago,5 retroactive legislation has not been the
focus of much commentary.6 Rather, current scholarship has tended
before it, that new rule is to be retroactively applied to private conduct arising before the new
rule, and to all cases pending that are not yet final. See id. at 97. Accordingly, prospectivity is
assumed with respect to new legislation, while retroactivity is acceptable for new judicial rules.
When questions of state law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to
determine the retroactivity of their own decisions. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref.
Co, 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). A state is also free to provide an exclusively predeprivation
remedy for when a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 38 & n.21 (1990) (assessing challenges to taxes).
However, if a state holds out a "clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy, it cannot later
declare that no such remedy exists after the statute to which the remedy applies is declared
unconstitutional. See Reich v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 547, 550 (1994). In 1995 the Court concluded
that the Harper retroactivity rule for new judge-made rules does not give state courts sufficient
legal leeway to create exceptions from the application of the new rule based on reasonable
reliance interests in the former state law. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 115 S. Ct. 1745
(1995).
3. In 1988 the Court presaged the Landgrafprospectivity rule when it decided a case that
concerned the retroactivity of rules from administrative agencies. See Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). Bowen established that (1) federal administrative rules may
have legal consequences only for the future, and (2) a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking
authority will not encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless the legislature
expressly conveys that power. See id. at 208-09.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1985);
Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation,
73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960); Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61
TEX. L. REV. 425 (1982); W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in
Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REV. 216 (1960); Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against
Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936);
Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TEX. L. REv. 409 (1928); Edward S.
Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 MICH. L. REV.
30(1939).
6. A text that is still required reading on the general subject of retroactivity is LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). An excellent historical account of the Court's
approach to retroactive legislation can be found in James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework
1997]
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to discuss retroactivity in a judicial,7 criminal,' or administrative
context. This Article reconsiders, in light of recent judicial
developments, the problem of retroactivity, and proposes a new way
of thinking about nonpenal legislative retroactivity.
Part I suggests that legislation should be classified according to
how it alters the temporal legal consequences of past and present
private actions. Use of this proposed classification system reveals that
the most common type of retroactive legislation operates with what
will be termed "secondary retroactivity," which is where the legal
consequences of past private actions are altered only in the future.
Part II considers the traditional doctrinal justifications for laws that
apply with secondary retroactivity. Part II concludes that, although
secondary retroactivity permits legislatures to achieve certain
political goals, it produces so many social and economic costs that its
validity should be suspect.'"
Parts III through V argue that the negative consequences of
retroactive lawmaking should encourage, and in fact have caused,
for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
87 (1993); see also Jill E. Fiseh, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach,
110 HARV. L. REv. 1055 (1997) (attempting to harmonize concerns of efficiency and fairness
regarding retroactivity analysis).
7. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-
Making, 75 B.U. L. REv. 941 (1995); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law,
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1733 (1991); Paul E.
McGreal, Back to the Future: The Supreme Court's Retroactivity Jurisprudence, 15 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 595 (1992); William M. Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling
and the Revival of"Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 1902 (1993).
8. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143 (1996); L. Anita Richardson & Leonard B. Mandell,
Fairness Over Fortuity: Retroactivity Revisited and Revised, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 11.
9. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Adjudicative Retroactivity in Administrative Law, 1991
Sup. CT. REv. 261 (1992); William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity andAdministrative Rulemaking,
1991 DUKEL.J. 106.
10. See FULLER, supra note 6, at 53 ("Taken by itself, and in abstraction from its possible
function in a system of laws that are largely prospective, a retroactive law is truly a
monstrosity."); Andrew C. Weiler, Note, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial
Rubberstamping of Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1071-75 (1993) (stating
that retroactive legislation should be subject to more meaningful judicial review because of "the
inherent injustice of retroactive laws").
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reviewing courts to empower private parties with three defenses to
defeat retroactively-applying legislation.
Part III shows that while laws intended to apply with secondary
retroactivity are usually valid, those that operate with what will be
termed "primary retroactivity"-laws that alter the past legal
consequences of past private actions-are usually invalid." Part IV
analyzes the 1994 Supreme Court decision in Landgrafv. USI Film
Products.2 The Landgraf case illustrates how the Court has become
far more sympathetic to parties burdened by legislation that applies
with secondary retroactivity. In Landgraf, the Court returns to an
expansive definition of retroactivity, which is broad enough to
encompass the idea of secondary retroactivity. 3 Landgraf holds that
legislative changes that may be characterized as retroactive under the
Landgraf definition, must be subject to a presumption of
prospectivity. This presumption prevents the operation of legislation
that might otherwise burden existing substantive rights with
secondary retroactivity. The presumption is not rebutted unless the
legislative body expresses its intent to apply the new law with
secondary retroactivity. 4
Part V advances a theory for invalidating secondarily retroactive
laws that articulate a legislative intent which rebuts the Landgraf
presumption of prospectivity. Part V argues that such intentional
secondary retroactivity is forbidden when pre-enactment conduct has
attained "protected legal status" with respect to the new,
retroactively-applying rule. Pre-enactment private conduct has
"protected legal status" when various constitutional provisions 5 and
11. See Plaut, 115 S. CL at 1456 (stating that legislation which alters what the law was at
an earlier, pre-enactment time, is invalid).
12. 511 U.S. 244 (1994). See also supra note 1.
13. The Landgraf opinion expands the definition of retroactivity to include changes in the
law which attach "new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment." Id. at
269-70. A more narrow definition would have limited the Landgraf rule only to statutes that
take effect from a time anterior to their passage. After Landgraf, a law which in the future
disrupts certain settled expectations, imposes new obligations, or increases liability for past
actions, is retroactive because the law attaches new legal consequences to prior acts. See id.
14. See id. at 270.
15. Landgraf recognizes "that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several
provisions of our Constitution." Id at 266. The most prominent of these provisions are the
1997]
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equitable principles,16 which track a formula articulated in the
Landgrafopinion,"7 operate to immunize the conduct from secondary
retroactivity.
I. CLASSIFYING THE TEMPORAL APPLICATION OF LEGISLATION
A. How Does A New Law Apply? A Proposed Classification Scheme
Legislative rules may be adopted by federal, state, and local
legislative and administrative bodies. When these entities enact or
adopt legislation, the new rule may apply to private parties in one of
three ways. If the legislation is purely prospective, then its provisions
affect private behavior and events occurring only after the applicable
effective dates of the legislation. Laws that are prospective alter the
future (post-enactment) legal consequences of private action. Where
legislation burdens substantive rights held by private parties prior to
its enactment, and is ambiguous or silent as to its effective date, it is
presumed to be prospective. 8
If the new law attaches new legal consequences to events
completed before its enactment, it operates retroactively. Laws that
apply retroactively may be classified as operating with either
Takings and Due Process clauses, U.S. CoNsT. amends. V & XIV (protecting private property),
and the Contracts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ch. 1 (protecting contract rights). See, e.g.,
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that the Contracts Clause
prevents retroactive alteration of contract with state bondholders); Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 584-90 (1935) (holding that the Takings Clause invalidates a
bankruptcy law that retroactively abrogates a vested property interest).
16. Landgraf acknowledges that arguments against retroactivity may also be based upon
"[e]lementary consideration of fairness" found outside the Constitution. 511 U.S. at 265. For
example, Landgraf seems to resurrect the vested rights doctrine as a bar to secondary
retroactivity. See id. at 290-93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's "vested rights"
approach to retroactivity). In addition, the equitable estoppel doctrine protects private property
owners from retroactive changes in the law if the owner has relied, in good faith, upon some act
or omission of government, and if there has been a substantial change in position by the owner
as a result of this reliance. See CHARLES L. SIEMON ET AL., VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS 13 (1982).
17. The Landgraf opinion suggests that the validity of retroactive legislation may depend
on the "nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the
operation of the new rule and a relevant past event." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270.
18. Seeid at 269-73.
[Vol. 52:81
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secondary or primary retroactivity. Secondary retroactivity occurs far
more frequently than primary retroactivity. A law that operates with
secondary retroactivity affects the legality of past private action in the
future, after the applicable date of the law.' 9 Primary retroactivity
alters the legal consequences of past private action.2" Action that was
legally permissible at the time it occurred, is either made
impermissible, or is burdened, in the past (i.e., prior to the applicable
date of the new law). These three possibilities are diagrammed in
Figure 1.
19. See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 219-20 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring); John K. McNulty, Corporations and the Intertemporal Conflict of
Laws, 55 CAL. L. REV. 12, 58-60 (1967).
20. See supra note 19.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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FIGURE 1
PROSPECTIVITY:
applicability of new law
Private Behavior I
n.ew aw 
1
SECONDARY RETROACTIVITY:
applicability of new law
Private Behavior
nw l aw
PRIMARY RETROACTIVITY:
applicability of new law
Private Behavior
nw nlaw
B. When Does Retroactivity In validate Legislation?
New legislation can apply prospectively, or with primary or
secondary retroactivity. This classification scheme does not reveal
whether, and when, the fact of retroactivity invalidates the law. Nor
does it establish whether a legislative body may validate retroactive
laws simply by expressing an intent that the new law apply with
[Vol. 52:81
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either primary or secondary retroactivity. The following list
summarizes possible rules regarding the relationship between
legislative intent and the ultimate validity of retroactive legislation:
(1) All retroactive laws, regardless of whether the law applies
with primary or secondary retroactivity, are valid so long as
the legislature intends for the law to be retroactive.
(2) All retroactive laws are invalid, regardless of legislative
intent.
(3) Laws that operate with primary retroactivity are invalid,
regardless of legislative intent. However, laws intended by the
legislature to operate with secondary retroactivity are valid.
In two significant opinions involving primary and secondary
retroactivity, the Supreme Court seems to have rejected all three of
the above possibilities. The Court instead has adopted a more flexible
rule.
In 1995, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Court addressed
the question of whether a federal statute could require federal courts
to reopen federal judgments in private civil actions.2 It concluded
that such a law violates constitutional separation of power
principles.' The Court also suggested that "retroactive legislation
that requires its own application in a case already finally adjudicated"
is invalidly retroactive.' The statute operated with primary
retroactivity because it altered the legal consequences of past action.
The Court in Plaut confirms the traditional view that primary
retroactivity is usually invalid, regardless of legislative intent.24
21. See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). In Plaut, a Securities Exchange Act section
provided for reinstatement of actions that had been dismissed as time barred after the court
established a uniform limitations period if they would have been timely under the previously
existing laws.
22. See id. at 1463.
23. Id at 1456, 1460 (stating that statutes are impermissibly retroactive which subject "a
judgment . . . to a reopening requirement which did not exist when the judgment was
pronounced"). See also supra note 1.
24. See infra Part III.C.
1997]
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In 1994, in Landgraf, the Court addressed the more frequently-
occurring issue of secondarily retroactive legislation.' The Landgraf
Court considered the question of whether a federal statute, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, could apply with secondary retroactivity.26
Landgraf concluded that if legislation was secondarily retroactive
(i.e., it attached new legal consequences to events completed before
its enactment), then its retroactive nature would not, by itself,
invalidate the new law." The Court noted two important
requirements for the validity of retroactive legislation. First, the
legislative body must have unambiguously expressed its intent for the
law to be secondarily retroactive.28 Without clear legislative intent, a
law is presumed to apply prospectively only.29 Second, even if the
legislature clearly expresses its intent that the law apply with
secondary retroactivity, the law may still be invalidated if it violates
one of the "antiretroactivity principle[s that] find expression in
several provisions of our Constitution." '3 These "antiretroactivity
principles" may be used by private parties whose pre-enactment
conduct provides them with protected legal status from application of
the new law. The elements of protected legal status, discussed more
fully in Part V, are as follows: (1) the new law must be intended to
alter future legal consequences of past private action (i.e., it must be
intentionally secondarily retroactive); (2) the past private action must
25. See supra note 1.
26. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 creates a right to recover compensatory and punitive
damages for certain violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Pub. L. 102-166,
§ 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a).
In 1989 the plaintiff in Landgraf brought suit against her employer for allegedly violating
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 248. Her complaint was
dismissed because she was not entitled to the equitable relief permitted by Title VII, which at
that time did not authorize the recovery of damages. See id. at 249. While her appeal was
pending, the 1991 Act permitting the recovery of damages was signed into law. See id. The
question before the Supreme Court in Landgraf was whether the compensatory and punitive
damage provision of § 102 of the 1991 Act should apply, post-enactment, to conduct that
occurred before the effective date of the 1991 Act. See id. at 250.
27. See id. at 267-70.
28. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270 (citing United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399,
413 (1806)).
29. See id. at 280.
30. Seeidat266.
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have some legal status-it must have resulted in the creation of a
property interest, contract, or some other vested right; and (3) that
legal status must also be protected by some antiretroactivity principle,
found either in the Constitution31 or in equity.32
The following guidelines thus determine whether legislation is
impermissibly retroactive:
* Laws which the legislature intends to apply with primary
retroactivity are usually invalid.
* Laws which the legislature intends to apply with secondary
retroactivity are usually valid as long as the legislature rebuts
the presumption of prospectivity with an unambiguous
statement of legislative intent.
* If the legislature does not rebut the presumption of
prospectivity with language that requires secondary
retroactivity, the retroactive application is valid unless it
affects private actions that have protected legal status.
These general rules provide private parties with several defenses
against retroactive legislation. Part II discusses the doctrinal
justifications that support successful judicial attacks on retroactively-
applying laws.
II. THE CASE AGAINST RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
A. Choice of Law Options for Legislative Bodies
In the most frequently-occurring and straightforward type of
retroactivity, a legislative body adopts a substantive rule which alters
the future legal consequences of private action taken pursuant to a
previously valid legislative rule. This is secondary retroactivity. The
new rule may have been adopted to override a previous legislatively-
31. Seeid. Seealso note 15.
32. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) ("Retroactive
legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by
prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset
settled transactions.").
1997]
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made rule" or to change both an old legislative rule and an agency
rule adopted pursuant to the legislation. 4 In either situation, private
behavior occurring pursuant to an old rule will be affected in the
future by the operation of the new rule.
The typical sequence of events for changes in legislative rules and
private action is as follows:
(1) The legislative body adopts a substantive rule (the "old
law").
(2) After its adoption, private conduct occurs consistent with,
or perhaps because of, this old law.
(3) The legislative body adopts a new substantive rule (the
"new law").
(4) After its adoption, the new law in some way affects the
legal consequences of the private conduct that occurred under
the old law.
For example, assume that in 1960 a Board of County
Commissioners imposed a zoning classification on six acres within its
jurisdiction. This classification contained a one-half acre minimum
lot size requirement. Under the 1960 zoning rule (the "old law"), a
maximum of 12 homes could be built on the six acres. In 1997, the
Board rezones the six acre parcel so that it is now subject to a two
acre minimum lot size requirement. As a consequence of this change
in the law (the "new law") only three homes can be built on the six
acres.
The applicable legislative body, the Board, has a choice-of-law
problem that it must resolve in one of the following ways:
33. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 250-57 (Civil Rights Act of 1991 changes Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990)
(Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982 amends the federal statute previously in effect
governing awards of post-judgment interest); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S.
696, 708-10 (1974) (Education Amendments of 1972 change the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
34. See Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985) (Education Amendments of 1978
alter the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and administrative regulations in
effect in 1972).
[Vol. 52:81
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(1) The Board can intend that the new law apply prospectively
only. In that case, the new two-acre minimum lot size
requirement will only apply to events occurring after its 1997
adoption date. A builder who had purchased six acres prior to
the effective date of the 1997 law, and had applied for building
permits for twelve homes would be subject to the 1960 zoning
rule permitting one-half acre minimum lots."
(2) The Board can fail to reveal its intent about whether the
new law should be prospective or retroactive. In this case, the
Landgraf presumption of prospectivity applies. The
presumption will yield the same result as in option (1); the
"old" 1960 zoning rule will apply to builders who purchased
land and applied for building permits prior to 1997.
(3) The Board can expressly state in the ordinance that the new
law operates with primary retroactivity. In that case, the new
law applies in the past, supplanting the 1960 old law with the
1997 new law as the operative rule from 1960 to 1997. Events
occurring between 1960 and 1997 are made subject to the more
restrictive requirements of the new law. A builder who
constructed twelve homes prior to 1997 is in violation of the
new two acre minimum lot size rule. This builder will likely be
able to successfully challenge the 1997 rule.36
(4) The Board can expressly state that the new law operates
with secondary retroactivity. In that case, the unambiguous
expression of legislative intent rebuts the Landgraf
presumption of prospectivity. The new law only applies after
its 1997 adoption date, but it may affect, after its adoption
date, events that occurred prior to 1997. A builder can defeat
35. In some jurisdictions, the filing of an application for a building permit prevents
retroactive application of any subsequent law. See, e.g., Friends of the Law v. King County, 869
P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (stating that land developer's rights vest at the time of
application and the application must be evaluated under the laws in effect at that time); South
Fork Coalition v. Board of Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 792 P.2d 882, 886 (Idaho 1990)
(stating that an applicant's rights are determined by the law in existence at the time of filing an
application for a building permit).
36. See infra notes 128-29.
1997l
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the intentional secondarily retroactive rule only if events
occurring prior to 1997 have achieved protected legal status.
37
A central thesis of this Article is that when a legislative body,
such as the Board of County Commissioners in the above example,
contemplates changes in applicable law, the changes generally should
operate prospectively. Another proposition this Article advances is
that when a legislative body intends that a new law apply
retroactively, the scope of protected legal status should be broad
enough to provide private parties with meaningful defenses to the
retroactivity. Both propositions are grounded in the argument that
while retroactivity often serves benign and legitimate purposes, the
37. See infra Part V.A.2.
If the builder purchased the six acres between 1960 and 1997 but took no steps toward
subdividing or selling the lots, it is unlikely that his past actions in purchasing the land have any
protected legal status. Although the application of the new 1997 rule will adversely affect the
builder's investment plans if the purpose of the initial purchase was to develop twelve homes,
merely burdening the fiiture profitability of the property does not confer protected legal status.
See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding that developers who purchased land
with intent to subdivide were subject to a subsequent zoning change limiting development);
Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861 P.2d 554, 560 (Alaska 1993) (stating that the mere purchase of
five lots does not grant purchaser protected legal status immunizing purchaser from the police
power); Mansfield Apartment Owners Ass'n v. City of Mansfield, 988 F.2d 1469, 1476-78 (6th
Cir. 1993) (stating that although a landlord's property has legal status, that status is not
protected, in that it does not prevent a locality from retroactively (1) imposing on the landlord
the duty in the future to pay the tenant's unpaid water bills, and (2) refusing to provide water
service until the delinquent accounts of former tenants are paid).
However, if in addition to purchasing the land, the developer also received some
commitment from the relevant government body authorizing the construction of twelve homes,
the developer's past actions may have protected legal status. For differing treatments of plat
applications, compare Friends of the Law v. King County, 869 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Wash. 1994)
(en bane) (stating that mere application for approval of plat-even without approval-confers
protected legal status), and Robinson v. Lintz, 420 P.2d 923, 927 (Ariz. 1966) (lots become
legally established and protectable when County properly records plat), with R. A. Vachon &
Son, Inc. v. City of Concord, 289 A.2d 646, 649 (N.H. 1972) (stating that even final approval of
plat does not place lots beyond authority of zoning changes), and Stucker v. Summit County,
870 P,2d 283, 288 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that platting does not confer protected legal
status).
For the treatment of building permits, compare Hy Kom Development Co. v. Manatee
County, 837 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (stating that a vested right may be created in
a building permit), with L.M. Everhart Construction, Inc. v. Jefferson County Planning
Commission, 2 F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the issuance of building permit does not
vest rights against future changes in zoning regulations), and Littlefield v. Inhabitants ofLyman,
447 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Me. 1982) (same).
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negative aspects are sufficiently disruptive and harmful to justify
more extensive judicial limitations of retroactive legislation that are
currently employed.
B. The Limited Justifications for Retroactivity
1. Retroactivity for Non-Substantive Changes and for Changes in
Judge-Made Law
Non-substantive laws that operate retroactively help to rectify or
prevent injustices that may have been caused by the previous law. For
example, so-called "curative legislation" will be upheld when the
legislation: (1) ratifies prior official conduct of government officers
who acted without the requisite authority,38 or (2) retroactively cures
defects in an administrative system. 9 Retroactive curative rules are
acceptable because of the strong public interest in a fair government
system, and because they merely produce the same result that would
have occurred had the lawmaker (usually an agency) promulgated the
original rule correctly.' An amendment which merely "clarifies"
existing law may also be applied retroactively.4'
38. This situation usually arises when government officials assert that some duty must be
performed-e.g., payment of a duty or tariff-and their authority is later found invalid. See
Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337 (1937); United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S.
370(1907).
39. See Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370 (1940) (upholding Act of
Congress enacted to cure a defect in the administration of a claim under the Longshoremen's &
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
40. See Delmay v. Paine Webber, 872 F.2d 356, 358 (1lth Cir. 1989) ("[C]ourts have
been especially careful to give retrospective application to curative measures."); Cromwell v.
MacLean, 25 N.E. 932, 935 (N.Y. 1890) (stating that a statute may be cured if the irregularity or
omission could have been corrected by a prior statute); see also Hochman, supra note 5, at 703-
706; Munzer, supra note 5, at 468-470. But see Washington Nat'l Arena Ltd. Partnership v.
Treasurer, 410 A.2d 1060, 1069 (Md. 1980) ("The presence of curative language ... cannot
render a statute immune from constitutional challenge on retroactivity grounds. If it did, any
retroactive legislation could be shielded from a successful constitutional attack merely by the
insertion of such language.").
41. See GTE Sprint Communications Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
441, 444-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("Where a statute or amendment clarifies existing law, such
action is not considered a change because it merely restates the law as it was at the time, and
retroactivity is not involved."); Tomlinson v. Clarke, 825 P.2d 706, 713 (Wash. 1992) (en bane)
("When an amendment clarifies existing law and where that amendment does not contravene
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When a statute is remedial in nature (i.e., they vary the penalties
that may be imposed for violating a statute, or the methods by which,
or the time in which, rights of action can be enforced) it may apply
retroactively to existing rights of action.42 Remedial statutes may be
retroactive if a potential plaintiff's ability to enforce substantive
rights is left substantially unimpaired.43 Similarly, the Supreme Court
has "regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting
jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying
conduct occurred or when the suit was filed." The reasoning behind
retroactive application of a new jurisdictional rule is that it usually
previous constructions of the law, the amendment may be deemed curative, remedial, and
retroactive.").
42. Landgraf left open the question of whether there are constitutional limitations on the
retroactive application of punitive damage statutes; the Court instead focused its analysis on the
powers of the legislature to upset settled expectations as to what the law requires. See Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 265. The Court has indicated that punitive damage awards must comply with due
process. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (finding
punitive damage award not so "grossly excessive" as to violate due process). Lower courts have
concluded that due process permits retroactive imposition of punitive damages if a party has
notice that its conduct might be sufficiently "egregious" to support an award of punitive
damages under prior law. See Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1243-45 (10th Cir.
1996); see also In re Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242, 24647 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that applying a new statute in a pending case which limits fees paid to the Referees' Salary and
Expense Fund in bankruptcy required refunding the amounts paid in excess of the limit). But
see Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1578 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to
extend the reasoning for allowing retroactive application of a public remedial scheme for
recovery to an amendment creating a private remedial scheme).
With respect to enforcement, see Bradley, 416 U.S. at 710-24 (permitting retroactive
application of a statute authorizing an award of attorneys' fees); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S.
620, 628-29 (1885) (stating that retroactive repeal of a limitations period does not violate due
process); FDIC v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 486-87 (9th Cir. 1991) (permitting
retroactive application of a statute of limitations); Sibley v. United States Dep't of Educ., 913 F.
Supp. 1181, 1188 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that retroactive appeal of statute of limitations
applicable to monetary debts does not violate due process); Slawson, supra note 5, at 242
("Time periods [for statutes of limitations] generally can be lengthened or shortened as the
legislature desires, even to the extent of reviving claims previously barred.").
43. See Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886, 898-99 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Johnson
v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the Bradley presumption
of applicability of law as of the time of decision pertains to "remedial provision[s]-not
substantive obligations or rights under a statute"); United States v. Peppertree Apartments, 942
F.2d 1555, 1561 (1 Ith Cir. 1991) (stating that an intervening statutory amendment authorizing
double damages was "remedial" in nature and thus properly applied retroactively).
44. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274.
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does not alter any substantive right, but simply changes the forum
that hears the case.45
While changes affecting substantive rights should usually be
prospective,4 6 a different rule exists when changes affect "procedural"
rights." A new procedural rule, such as one requiring notice and an
opportunity for explanation, may be retroactively applied,48 unless
retroactive application of the procedural change would create a
manifest injustice or affect substantive rights.4 9 Unfortunately, the
label "substantive" is conclusory, and neither the Supreme Court nor
lower courts have been particularly helpful in defining when rights
and liabilities affected by statutory changes are substantive. Attempts
at defining the scope of the word "substantive" include the following:
"vested or mature right[s]"; 0 "matured property-like interests";1
45. See Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916); United States ex rel. Newsham
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 907 F. Supp. 1349, 1357 (N.D. Cal. 1995). However, if a
statute "does not merely allocate jurisdiction among fora[, but rather] creates jurisdiction where
none previously existed ... it ... speaks... to the substantive rights of the parties" and is
subject to the presumption against retroactivity. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 117 S. Ct. 1871, 1878 (1997) (emphasis in original).
46. See, e.g., United States v. TRW, Inc., 4 F.3d 417,422 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Boddie
v. American Broad. Co., 881 F.2d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 1989)); Wright v. Director, Fed.
Emergency Management Agency, 913 F.2d 1566, 1574 (1lth Cir. 1990) (stating that an
intervening regulatory amendment of insurance policy exclusion clause affects unconditional
contractual relationship and therefore may not apply retroactively in the absence of legislative
intent).
47. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 ("Changes in procedural rules may often be applied in suits
arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity."); Thorpe v.
Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (stating that a procedural requirement that local
housing authorities provide tenants with reasons for eviction which was adopted while case was
pending applies to litigants because, among other reasons, it does not infringe on any rights);
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1995); Baynes
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d 1370, 1374 (1lth Cir. 1992) (stating that the fact that
statutory changes are procedural in nature as opposed to substantive weighs in favor of
retroactive application).
48. See Thorpe, 393 U.S. 268 (new hearing requirement).
49. See Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 937 (7th Cir.
1992) (stating that because "the retroactive application of a procedural provision [to a case on
appeal] could require a new trial and could, therefore, require double expenses [it] would rise to
the level of manifest injustice" and apply retroactively); Raya v. Maryatt Indus., 829 F. Supp.
1169, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that retroactive application of the ADA would result in
manifest injustice because it imposes new obligations and affects substantive rights).
50. See Boyce v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (E.D. Va. 1992).
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when persons are subjected to "greater liabilities"; 2 and changes
which are neither "remedial" nor "procedural. ' 3
Another instance where retroactivity is appropriate is when courts
change judge-made law. When the federal judicial power is exercised
to alter or overrule a previous judicial rule, retroactivity conforms to
Article III, which confers on the federal courts the power "to say
what the law is."54 The common law understood a tradition of
retroactivity for judicial decisions. Blackstone thought retroactivity
was an inherent characteristic of judicial power, 6 and Thomas
Cooley believed that the ability to make decisions retroactive was a
principal distinction between judicial and legislative power.
Prospective judicial decisionmaking may be criticized for
encouraging unprincipled judicial activism, because it permits courts
to disregard stare decisis.58 By 1993, the Supreme Court had
established a "firm rule" that new judge-made law announced in a
judicial decision will be retroactive. 9 In addition to these somewhat
51. SeeMozee, 963 F.2d at936.
52. See Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225,229 (7th Cir. 1992).
53. See Gersman, 975 F.2d at 899.
54. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
55. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965) ("At common law there was no
authority for the proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future."); Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349,372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Judicial decisions have
had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.").
56. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (1765)
("[The judicial power is] not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound
the old one.")
57. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 91 (1868) ("[lit is said that that
which distinguishes ajudicial from a legislative act is, that the one [judicial] is a determination
of what the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done or happened, while
the other [legislative] is a predetermination of what the law shall be for the regulation of all
future cases....').
58. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(stating that refusal to apply new judicial rules to all cases on direct appeal "mitigate[s] the
practical force of stare decisis"); Cass, supra note 7, at 971-973; Robert Von Moschzisker,
Stare Decisis in Courts ofLast Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV. 409,427-28 (1924).
59. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278-79 n. 32 (1994); Harper v.
Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-99 (1993). But see Abbott v. City of Los Angeles,
326 P.2d 484, 494-495 (Cal. 1958) (stating that where judicial decisions have been relied upon
in investing money or purchasing property they should be adhered to based on stare decisis).
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technical justifications for secondary retroactivity, there are two more
general, widely-accepted rationales.
2. The Change-Is-Good Rationale
One rationale advanced to justify secondary retroactivity is that a
system of laws which is purely prospective in nature would be too
confining and limiting to a lawmaker wishing to improve the status
quo. Secondary retroactivity might be needed if the old law has been
found to be unworkable, 6' or if it has produced undesirable effects.6
Also, if a party harmed by a legislative rule successfully lobbies for
its change, secondary retroactivity permits the past interests of that
party to be benefited by the change in the future. Retroactivity thus
encourages private individuals to press legislators to rethink old
notions, and to improve the quality of existing rules. Retroactive
lawmaking provides legislators with a potentially valuable tool to
attain social and political goals.6"
Unfortunately, the change-is-good rationale ignores the fact that
retroactive change holds the potential of adversely affecting those
who in good faith have reasonably relied on the then extant legal
regime. Indeed, it has been said that the hallmark of an invalid
retroactive law is a law which serves to defeat the reasonable
expectations of the person it affects.63 Even if the purpose of
retroactive application is to rearrange or nullify the effect of an earlier
law to correct inappropriate welfare distributions, the
accomplishment of that otherwise benign purpose may harm those
who have assumed that current rules will continue. It may be wrong
60. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 267-68 ("Retroactivity provisions often serve... to correct
mistakes . . . or simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers
salutary.").
61. See, e.g., Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, 283 F.2d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating that the FDA may retroactively revoke its
previous certification of certain food additives based on public concerns about the original
certification); see also Munzer, supra note 5, at 471 (discussing the curative aspects of
retroactive statutes).
62. See Krent, supra note 8, at 2156 (stating that retroactivity helps legislatures reach
policy objectives).
63. See Stimson, supra note 5, at 37-38.
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to conclude that the benefits resulting from the new distribution will
always outweigh the harm experienced by those who relied on a
continuation of existing laws.' Moreover, those who lobby for the
retroactive change may be far more interested in altering laws to aid a
powerful minority, not the larger public interest.6' A change-is-good
theory cannot fully justify secondary retroactivity.
3. The Unreasonable Expectations Rationale
The other general rationale attacks the argument that retroactivity
should be discouraged (or made illegal) because it defeats the
"expectations" of private parties. This defense is premised on the
notion that private expectations should not be protected from
retroactivity when they are unreasonable. Expectations are said to be
unreasonable if parties holding the expectation either had a duty to
take future changes into account in their decisions, or somehow had
notice of the likelihood that there would be a change in the applicable
law.' Some commentators have argued "that private parties should
anticipate and protect themselves against future changes in
government policy, just as they protect themselves from changes in
the private market."'6 When there is constructive notice of change,
the expectation-holders are presumed to have assumed the risk that
there would be no change. Having taken their chances and lost the
bet, there should be no legal recourse when the law does change and
applies retroactively in the future to affect an unreasonable
64. See Krent, supra note 8, at 2160-67 (discussing the interests implicated by
retroactivity in civil and criminal contexts).
65. See Einer R Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intensive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
66. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,
508 U.S. 602, 646 (1993) ("[The private party] could have had no reasonable expectation that it
would not be faced with [future] liability. . . "); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70 & n.24
(stating that a statute is not retroactive merely because it upsets expectations based in prior
law); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) (finding no taking when
expectations under a contract are frustrated, but not appropriated, by lawful government action).
67. Krent, supra note 8, at 2164. See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 598-602 (1986) (discussing factoring in potential
changes in law that increase liability into initial risk assessments).
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expectation. Moreover, nothing in the Constitution says that
reliance on the continuation of existing civil laws is protected.69
The "unreasonable expectation" defense of retroactivity is
grounded in the belief that when changes are foreseeable, one
adversely affected by a change does not have sufficiently clean hands
to challenge the validity of the retroactive law. The central problem
with this justification for retroactivity is that there is no principled
way to put borders on it. Given the constantly changing legal and
political process, it is impossible to say that change is ever
unanticipated. A logical extension of the unreasonable expectation
theory would allow the government to argue that because all persons
have actual or constructive knowledge that laws often change, no
retroactively-applying law may ever be invalidated for its
retroactivity. All persons affected by the retroactivity have always
been on notice that the law might change. Therefore, no one should
ever have held an expectation based on then-existing laws. Such
expectations would be per se unreasonable.
Of course, such a result would wreak havoc with America's
economic market system. The market functions because its actors can
rely on a set of rules that permit them to make decisions. When this
reliance is deemed so unreasonable as to not be worthy of judicial or
constitutional protection, then decisions must be made in the absence
of predictable rules. Without rules backed by law, there is no
68. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 644-45 (stating that there is no reasonable basis for
employer to expect that the legislative ceiling of liability on its federally regulated pension plan
would never be lifted); General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 192 (1992)
("[P]etitioners knew they were taking a risk [in relying on the old law], but they took their
chances .... Having now lost the battle in the [state legislature], petitioners wished to continue
the war in court."); EEOC v. Puget Sound Log Scaling & Grading Bureau, 752 F.2d 1389 (9th
Cir. 1985) (stating that reliance was unreasonable because prior administrative interpretations
had signaled the agency's future position); Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 648-49 (5th Cir.
1979) (stating that a change of criteria used by agency "are not such a new departure [from
previous criteria] that they could not reasonably have been foreseen").
69. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution does protect individuals who rely on
non-retroactive criminal law. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989) (determining when a civil sanction constitutes "criminal" punishment);
Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that when a civil sanction can be
characterized as punishment it implicates expostfacto concerns).
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foreseeability or accountability. The market would largely cease to
work. The unreasonable expectations defense fails to justify
unchecked retroactivity. 0
C. The Problem with Retroactivity
When the legislature intends a law to apply with primary
retroactivity, the retroactivity itself usually invalidates the law.7'
When legislation is intended to apply with secondary retroactivity,
the Landgrafprospectivity rule does not apply and the legislation can
safely operate on pre-enactment conduct, unless there is some
constitutional or equitable impediment which forbids the retroactive
application. What follows here is an examination of why these
impediments should be judicially acknowledged.
Theoretically, secondary retroactivity should be largely immune
from legal attack because, while it affects pre-enactment private
behavior, it does so only in the post-enactment future. Courts have
seized upon this future-applying aspect of secondary retroactivity to
justify its general validity.72 However, while such retroactivity is
similar to prospectivity because it takes effect only after enactment,
secondary retroactivity is unlike prospectivity because it draws upon
antecedent facts for its implementation. As a result, secondary
retroactivity produces negative consequences in three distinct time
periods: (1) the pre-enactment period; (2) the date of enactment; and
(3) the post-enactment period.
70. See Giles v. Adobe Royalty, Inc., 684 P.2d 406,412-13 (Kan. 1984) (declining to give
a law retroactive effect is proper when there has been reliance on the settled nature of the prior
law and application would result in substantial hardship).
71. SeePlautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1456 (1995).
72. Many courts characterize statutes that apply to pre-enactnent acts in the future as non-
retrospective or non-retroactive. See, e.g., Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922); Lohf v.
Casey, 466 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1972); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whitehouse, 868 F. Supp.
425,435 (D.RLL 1994).
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FIGURE 2
.4- enactment
old law new law
1. The Pre-enactment Period
Legislative decisions that operate with secondary retroactivity act
upon past circumstances and conduct. Those individuals whose
behavior triggered these past events cannot do anything in the pre-
enactment period to soften the blow of the new law. Therefore, with
secondary retroactivity, the option of altering behavior to avoid the
impact of the new law no longer exists.
When individuals are unable to evade a retroactive decision in the
pre-enactment period, there are two related consequences. The first
consequence involves uncertainty. Decisionmaking in the pre-
enactment period becomes problematic because those making
decisions are without knowledge concerning one critical variable-
the probability that existing law will continue in the future. As a
result of this uncertainty, decisionmaking during the pre-enactment
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period may be chilled. 3 Individuals will be reluctant to act if they are
unable to predict the likely outcome of a decision. They may be
deterred by the possibility of a change in the law with secondary
retroactive effects. These behavior changes in anticipation of
retroactivity generate social costs which take the form of deferred
investments and reduced risk-taking.74 By contrast, laws announced
in advance of private action allow individuals to predict how rules
will be applied to their future behavior. Such predictability is critical
to legal order.75
The second negative consequence of retroactivity during the pre-
enactment period involves expectations. When individuals cannot
take steps in the pre-enactment period to evade the post-enactment
imposition of new rules, settled expectations arising in the pre-
enactment period are undermined. This result is inconsistent with a
central purpose of law in a civilized society, which is to preserve the
expectations of individuals that are formed in light of existing laws,
as well as actions taken in reliance on those laws.76 Laws that operate
73. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 3 (1985) ("Uncertainty and insecurity make it difficult to plan, which
prevents individuals from effectively utilizing their talents and external goals."); Frederick
Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 689-94 (1978) (describing the deterrent effect of uncertainty in a free speech
context).
74. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197-232,313-75 (1921).
75. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61
(1897); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 271 ("The largest category of cases in which we have
applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting
contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are of prime
importance.").
76. See Munzer, supra note 5, at 427-28,429,430,432.
An expectation is a disposition to predict that certain event will occur together with
(characteristically) an attitude of being able to count on its occurrence.
... [Tihe law should shelter legal expectations that are rational, or that are legitimate
within the legal system.
... [A]n expectation is rational if the probability assigned to the predicted event
corresponds suitably to the actual likelihood that it will occur...
The legitimacy of an expectation within a legal system depends on whether the
expectation is supported... by the underlying justifications of the laws inducing it....
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with secondary retroactivity are inconsistent with this premise." In
the post-enactment period, such laws may defeat planned investments
of labor, interfere with uses of property, conflict with personal
autonomy, and impair contracts." Such disruption in private patterns
of conduct may be particularly severe if the old law had been in
effect for a considerable time in the pre-enactment period.7 9 As John
Austin once observed, "[W]henever expectations have been raised in
accordance with the declared purpose and concession of the state, to
disappoint those expectations by recall of the concession . . . [is]
pernicious.""0
2. Enactment
At the time of enactment, a law that applies with secondary
retroactivity violates one prime tenet of the Rule of Law: Persons
subject to laws should have their behavior governed by rules fixed in
advance, because such rules then provide fair notice and warning to
those contemplating the action.8' As Justice Scalia observed: "The
Id See also Landgraf 511 U.S. at 265 ("[S]ettled expectations should not be lightly
disrupted"); Bott v. Commission of Natural Resources, 327 N.W.2d 838, 849 (Mich. 1982)
(stating that rules which induce "extensive reliance" should not be retroactively changed);
Krent, supra note 8, at 2160 ("Individuals should be able to rely on existing law when ordering
their affairs").
77. See Slawson, supra note 5, at 219 ("(1) Individuals commonly act so as to achieve
advantageous results. (2) Retroactive laws change the legal results of acts after these acts have
been performed. (3) Therefore retroactive laws defeat reasonable expectations and are
undesirable.").
78. See McDonald v. Watt, 653 F.2d 1035, 1045-46 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (stating
that retroactive application would cloud title to hundreds of leases); NLRB v. E & B Brewing
Co., 276 F.2d 594, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1960) (finding no public interest justification for applying
rule retroactively to private contract); see also Slawson, supra note 5, at 233 ("More than other
kinds of legally significant action... contracting is likely to be done with knowledge of, and
specific reliance on, the law.").
79. See NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1966).
80. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE § 1138, at 256-57 (Robert Campbell
ed., 1875). See also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-12 (C. K. Ogden
ed., 1931) (stating that security is the principal object of law, and "[a~s regards property,
security consists in receiving no check, no derangement to the expectation founded on the
laws").
81. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265, 270; see also Phillips v. Curiale, 608 A.2d 895, 899
(N.J. 1992) (noting the tension recognized by the court in Kaiser between applying the law in
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principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed
under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless
and universal human appeal.""2
The enactment of secondarily retroactive legislation allows private
behavior to be judged, post-enactment, by new, often unanticipated
rules. If a number of laws are adopted which act with secondary
retroactivity, individuals who find themselves surprised by new rules
learn that they cannot plan conduct with reasonable certainty of the
legal consequences. When market actors cannot plan because the
relevant rules are uncertain, this may result either in a disinclination
to act at all, or hedged action, where the actor takes cautious
compensatory measures to protect against future loss.
A law that operates with secondary retroactivity also has an
impact on existing property interests at the time of enactment.
Although such laws are effective only in the future, because they
apply to private property interests that existed prior to enactment,
they alter the expected value of property at the moment of enactment.
In other words, the change in expected future values will, at the time
of enactment, change the present value of affected property.
Therefore, property subject to laws that apply with secondary
retroactivity sustain three value changes: (1) Prior to enactment of the
new law, the value is determined by expectations based on the old
law; (2) at the time of enactment, expected future value changes alter
the present value; and (3) post-enactment, the value changes in the
future as a result of the operation of the new law. Such price
effect at the time of decision and antiretroactivity principles); FULLER, supra note 6, at 209-10
("Surely the very essence of the Rule of Law is that in acting upon the citizen ... a government
will faithfully apply rules previously declared as those to be followed by the citizen and as
being determinative of his rights and duties."); Krent, supra note 8, at 2143 ("[R]etroactive
lawmaking conflicts with rule-of-law aspirations .... ').
When a law has already put a party on notice of its effects, secondary retroactivity is
permissible. See DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 820 F. Supp. 876, 885 (D.N.J, 1993)
(finding no taking resulted from zoning ordinance because plaintiff had notice). Reliance on the
continuation of a law is unreasonable when the lawmaker has warned against such reliance, thus
putting the private party on notice that reliance may be inappropriate. See American Mach.
Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321, 1328-30 (5th Cir. 1970).
82. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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instability prevents market actors from making rational decisions
about long-term investments.83
Some commentators have argued that retroactive lawmaking
encourages legislative self-dealing. 4 For instance, legislators could
attempt to enact regulatory measures that would reward political
contributors and pay back those who supported their campaigns.
Retroactivity, particularly secondary retroactivity, may then be
viewed not as a weapon to advance the public good, but as a tool to
maximize the chances of legislators' re-election.85
3. The Post-enactment Period
Secondary retroactivity seems contrary to fundamental notions of
justice and fairness.8 6 Unless an individual's pre-enactment conduct is
assessed in the post-enactment period under the law that at the time
the individual engaged in that conduct, "[the law] can deprive
citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions. 87
These post-enactment effects are harmful to persons who have
reasonably relied to their detriment on a pre-enactment law.88 A new
law applied retroactively thwarts reliance by impairing the
83. See Graetz, supra note 5, at 1822-23; Kaplow, supra note 67, at 520-50.
84. See Krent, supra note 8, at 2159.
85. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
86. See LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 701-703 (1949) (discussing
the ability to legislate based on acceptance of the legislator); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1398, at 260 (4th ed. 1873) ("Retrospective
laws are . . .generally unjust; and . . .neither accord with sound legislation nor with the
fundamental principles of social compact"); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 280; Van
Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); Peoples Natural Gas Div. of N.
Natural Gas Co., v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 590 P.2d 960,962 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
The Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, was adopted to
prevent the unfairness of punishing an act which was not punishable at the time it was
committed. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,28 (1981).
87. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992).
88. See Smith, supra note 5, at 418-19 (1928); Stimson, supra note 5, at 37-38; see also
Frank I. Michelman, Property. Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation '" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (stating that "demoralization
costs" are the disabilities, in the form of impaired incentives or social unrest, to uncompensated
losers and their sympathizers affected in part by retroactive laws).
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advantages of planned conduct.8 9 In the post-enactment period,
secondary retroactivity may also remove a benefit currently enjoyed,
take away property currently held, or deprive a person of liberty to
act in a manner earlier permitted.9°
Lon Fuller maintained that the function of law was to provide a
mechanism for eliminating "the blind play of chance" by clear and
understandable rules previously declared and consistently applied.9
Secondary retroactivity is entirely at odds with this view of law.
Conversely, prospectivity reduces the role of chance by removing the
specter of behavior being judged by norms not yet in existence.
Prospectivity allows for possible changes in behavior to reduce the
risk of sanctions under existing laws. In addition, prospectivity is
consistent with elemental notions of fairness which demand that "a
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject
him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose."'92
Secondary retroactivity prevents persons from changing their pre-
enactment behavior to reduce the likelihood that they will incur a
post-enactment sanction.93 Prospectivity also fosters predictability.
Increased predictability permits individuals to make accurate value
assessments, which will increase the probability that they will devote
resources to maximize their utility.94
Legislation that applies retroactively, even legislation that applies
with secondary retroactivity, carries with it considerable costs. Parts
III through V argue that in response to these costs, three principles
have been judicially adopted which allow private parties otherwise
burdened by retroactivity to defeat retroactive legislation: (1) a
general prohibition against primary retroactivity; (2) a presumption of
89. See Smead, supra note 5, at 776-78.
90. See infra Part V (examining when persons have pre-enactment legal status that
protects them from such secondarily retroactive effects).
91. See FULLER, supra note 6, at 9,39.
92. BMIV of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996). See also Patton v. TIC
United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1996).
93. See Cass, supra note 7, at 952-53.
94. See id. at 960-61.
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nonretroactivity for legislation that otherwise could operate with
secondary retroactivity; and (3) a willingness to invalidate even
intentional secondary retroactivity when pre-enactment private action
has protected legal status.
III. CHANGING JUDICIAL VIEWS OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
RETROACTIVITY
The judiciary's traditional dislike of retroactive legislation can be
traced back in time to an early, but highly influential Nineteenth
Century case-Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v.
Wheeler.95 The Wheeler case recognized that statutes could be voided
not just for applying with primary retroactivity, but also when they
produced secondary retroactivity. As a result, for over a century
much legislation affecting property and economic interests was
voidable simply for operating with secondary retroactivity. In the
Twentieth Century, although legislation intended to apply with
primary retroactivity was usually invalidated, statutes that operated
with secondary retroactivity were typically sustained. Parts IV and V
demonstrate how a combination of Landgraf and the concept of
protected legal status have lately permitted courts to strike
secondarily retroactive legislation.
A. Original Recognition of Invalid Secondary Retroactivity
In the early years of American legal history, at the beginning of
the Nineteenth Century, there was dispute involving a central issue of
retroactivity: For a legislative action to be deemed improperly
retroactive, must it take effect before its enactment (i.e., primary
retroactivity), or was it enough that, following its enactment, the
legislation altered a pre-existing legal interest (i.e., secondary
retroactivity)? If the former, then laws could survive retroactivity
95. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156).
96, See WILLIAM P. WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF
RETROACTIVE LAWS, AS AFFECTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS § 1, at 2 (1880).
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challenges simply by taking effect as of the date of their adoption. If
the latter, existing private economic and property interests created
under an earlier legal regime could resist new legislation affecting
these interests in the future.
In Wheeler, Justice Story rejected the view that only laws with
primary retroactivity were invalid. Instead, he adopted the position
that even statutes that are secondarily retroactive ("statutes, which,
... operat[e] only from their passage") may be invalid.97 The Court
stated that if a statute satisfied this definition, it would be invalid
either if it (1) "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws," or (2) "creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or
considerations already past."98 Under this conception of secondary
retroactivity, statutes intended to become effective only after their
passage could still be invalidated, if they either interfered with vested
rights or imposed new duties or liabilities on earlier events.
The Wheeler notion of retroactivity did not mean that lawmakers
could not change rules affecting existing legal interests. The
prohibition against retroactive laws was limited to only those legal
interests that had been determined by pre-existing law to be "vested"
against substantive legislative modification." These included rights
that had been either vested by "contract,"'' or otherwise protected by
general prohibitions against deprivations of "property" except by due
process.'' Retroactive laws could still reach all interests that were not
vested, thereby avoiding a freezing of existing property rules that
might otherwise have occurred if non-vested interests had been
immune from legislative change.'0 2
97. 22 F. Cas. at 767.
98. Id.
99. See Kainen, supra note 6, at 105.
100. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
101. See Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834). See generally COOLEY, supra note
57, at § 353.
102. See MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL OTHODOXY 149-151 (1992); Eric F. Freyfogel, The Owning and Taking
of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77, 106-108 (1995); James L. Kainen, Nineteenth
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The Wheeler rule meant that retroactive legislation could not be
saved simply by an express legislative desire to affect private
interests post-enactment. More significantly, if the retroactivity was
secondary, it could not be applied to existing private legal
relationships if these had achieved protected legal status with respect
to the new statute. Protected legal status existed whenever certain
legal rights were deemed to be impaired, or if the statute operated to
increase liability or impose a new duty on past conduct.
B. The Rise of the Police Power and Decline of
Invalid Secondary Retroactivity
By the middle of the Twenthieth Century, the Supreme Court had
largely abandoned the strict Wheeler rule. Its demise was caused by
two difficulties associated with protecting "vested rights" from
subsequent legislative change. First, because vested rights included
many contract and property interests, courts had the power to review
the wisdom of much secondarily retroactive legislation specifically
intended to affect these interests, and to overturn this legislation if it
"impaired" these interests. This seemed to be an excessive exercise of
judicial power. Second, both commentators and courts believed that
the term "vested right" was conclusory, and not helpful in predicting
whether a law could be applied with secondary retroactivity to an
existing interest. °" The term was most often used to justify
invalidating a retroactive law that was defective for reasons other
than the law's impact on vested rights."°
For most of the Twentieth Century, retroactive legislation was not
tested against the Wheeler rule. Instead, the Supreme Court simply
determined whether the retroactivity was inconsistent with one of the
property-protective clauses of the Constitution-the Due Process,
Contracts, and Takings clauses. From the 1930s to the 1980s, the
Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to
Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 437 (1982).
103. See JOHN SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND 6
(1953); Smith, supra note 5, at 233.
104. See Kainen, supra note 6, at 112-14.
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judicial standard of review for these clauses was deferential rational
basis review, and retroactive legislation was typically sustained.
When courts used substantive due process to determine the
validity of secondarily retroactive laws, the legislation tended to be
validated. Under substantive due process analysis, the retroactive
aspects of legislation were no more than a factor to consider in
deciding whether secondarily retroactive legislation had
unconstitutionally interfered with existing property or economic
rights." 5 The pertinent question was not the effect of the retroactive
law on a "vested right," or whether the law had created a "new
obligation" burdening past transactions, or whether the law was
unfair, but whether retroactivity was a useful means of carrying out
the goal of the law.' The level of judicial review was extremely
deferential, and if the retroactive aspects of the legislation were a
"rational means" of furthering some legitimate legislative purpose,
then the retroactive provisions of the law would meet the test of due
process.'0 7 Moreover, if retroactive application of the new law was
rational, it could safely "readjust existing rights" and "upset
otherwise settled expectations.' 0 8
105. See id. at 111.
106. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.s. at 637 (finding no due process violations "even though
the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty... based on past acts"); Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1976); Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, 47
F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 1995).
107. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 192 (1992); Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray &
Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984); Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150, 156-57 (1st Cir.
1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3085 (July 3, 1997) (No. 97-42); Deck v. Peter
Romein's Sons, Inc., 109 F.3d 383, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1997); Carbon Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 100
F.3d 1124, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1996); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 878 P.2d 566, 607
(Cal. 1994).
108. Usery, 428 U.S. at 16. See also R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 729-30; Fleming v.
Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995)
(upholding the Coal Act even though it upsets settled expectations and imposes new duties or
liabilities based on past acts); Barrick Gold Exploration, 47 F.3d at 837-38; Lisbon Square v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 482, 490 (E.D. Wis. 1994). See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 139-
40(1992).
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Litigants were equally unsuccessful when they attempted to raise
retroactivity concerns in the context of non-due process constitutional
protections. During the Wheeler era, contract rights were considered
among the most sacrosanct vested rights protected against retroactive
legislation.'09 By the latter part of the Twentieth Century, however,
the Supreme Court had largely gutted the Contracts Clause as a
weapon to use against retroactivity. Even when a statute was found to
operate as a substantial impairment of an existing contractual
relationship, the statute was usually acceptable if "the legislature's
adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is
based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate
to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption.""
Unless a state was itself a contracting party, courts typically deferred
to a legislature's decision to retroactively alter existing private
contract interests.'
When property rights were not in contract form (and arguably
protected by the Contracts Clause), litigants looked to the Takings
Clause as the constitutional provision that might protect existing
property interests which had been adversely affected by a retroactive
change in applicable law. This was particularly so after the Supreme
Court stated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City".
that one factor that should be taken into account when determining if
a regulation was an unconstitutional taking was whether it had
"interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."' 3 This
protection of "investment-backed expectations" seemed to parallel
the Wheeler admonition against retroactive laws which either
impaired rights acquired under existing laws, or imposed new duties
on past "transactions or considerations." The "investment-backed
109. See supra note 101.
110. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505 (1987) (internal
quotations omitted). See also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400, 410-13 (1983); Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 29 F.3d 383, 385 (8th Cir.
1994).
111. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21-28 (1977).
112. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
113. ld. at 124.
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expectations" approach seemed to permit takings recoveries for
owners who could demonstrate that they had purchased their property
or made decisions about their property in reliance on an expectation
that did not include the challenged new regulation.
However, the Court quickly narrowed the scope of the protection
afforded property rights under the Penn Central takings test. A
distinct investment-backed expectation had to be more than a
unilateral expectation or an abstract need.14 There could be no taking
for retroactively-applying laws based on the Penn Central
"expectation" theory if the private property owner (1) had long been
subject to similar laws," 5 or (2) had somehow been put on notice that
a change in the law was possible."6 Notice could be constructive and
was implied if those subject to the new law operated in a heavily
regulated field." 7 A property owner who acted with constructive
knowledge of a future restraint could be said either to have no
reliance interest, or to have assumed the risk of any subsequent
economic loss." 8
114. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 106-07 n.15 (1985); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d
1066, 1074-75 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (concluding that bank holding company had no reasonable
expectation that the FDIC would not take over insolvent bank).
115. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645-46; R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 731-733;
Farmers Home Admin. v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958).
116. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645-46 (finding no reasonable expectation in light of
Congress' legislation in the pension field); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S.
211, 226-27 (1986) (same); Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(finding owner on notice that government actions were being planned); 767 Third Ave. Assocs.
v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that lessor, as a member of the
public, was on notice that the federal government could close an office leased to a foreign
government); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310,321-22 (Cl. Ct. 1991) (determining that
landowner who purchased wetlands with knowledge of the regulatory structure and the
difficulty of developing wetlands had no reasonable investment-backed expectation).
117. See Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. at 91; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ford Motor Credit
Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1389 (1 th Cir. 1994).
118. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528-530 (1992) (concluding that owner
of mobile home park knew rents could be regulated and invited tenants). Even if a private party
has a reasonable expectation that applicable law will not change, there is still no taking under
the Penn Central formulation if that party's "expectations can continue to be realized as long as
he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions . L..." ocke, 471 U.S. at 107.
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Judicial abandonment of the Wheeler rule, coupled with the
courts' reluctance to use of the Constitution's property-protective
clauses to halt backwards-looking legislation, meant that secondary
retroactivity was routinely upheld by courts. Throughout much of the
Twentieth Century, the judiciary sustained legislation that imposed
conditions on private parties which made it more difficult, more
expensive, or impossible in the post-enactment period either to: (1)
obtain a valuable legal interest despite taking steps to secure that
interest in the pre-enactment period,"' or (2) retain such an interest. 21
119. Examples of acceptable conditions that impose a barrier to the receipt of a legal
interest include the imposition of fees, see Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d
253 (3d Cir. 1995); Commercial Builders of N. California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991); Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n v. Riley, 907 F. Supp. 464 (D.D.C. 1995); Russ
Bldg. Partnership v. City of San Francisco, 750 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988); Blue Jeans Equities W. v.
City of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), a land dedication requirement
as a condition to a building permit, see Pengilly v. Multnomah County, 810 F. Supp. 1111 (D.
Or. 1992), or compliance with a low-income housing law as a condition to prepayment of a
loan, see Parkridge Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Farmers Home Admin., 13 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir.
1994).
120. Examples of acceptable conditions subsequent (usually imposed as a requirement to
retain an interest) include: a new obligation to obtain a permit, see American Mining Congress
v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1992) (EPA rule requiring storm water discharge
permits for inactive mining operations), charges for the privilege of construction granted under
prior federal contracts, see East Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm., 946 F.2d 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1991), or annual filing, see Locke, 471 U.S. at 104-07
(holders of preexisting unpatented mining claims must comply with law requiring annual filing
of affidavit of assessment work, or forfeit the claim); see also Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
516 (1982). Other acceptable conditions subsequent include future compliance with
environmental requirements, see Zerbetz v. Municipality of Anchorage, 856 P.2d 777 (Alaska
1993) (holding that municipality's designation of private property as "conservation wetlands" is
not a compensable taking); Public Resources Protection Ass'n of California v. Department of
Forestry & Fire Protection, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that timber
harvest plan approved before enactment can be conditioned on consistency with the Endangered
Species Act); Adams v. Thurston County, 855 P.2d 284, 291 (Wash. CL App. 1993) (stating
that the vesting of development rights does not defeat a county's discretionary ability to
condition or deny a plat based on environmental impacts), future compliance with new social
and welfare requirements, see Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F.
Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to existing
places of accommodation), disclosure of data, see Norfolk Energy, Inc. v. Hodel, 898 F.2d 1435
(9th Cir. 1990) (utility required to supply schematic drawings of facilities on non-federal, non-
Indian lands), conformance with the conditions of a new rent control law, see Levald, Inc. v.
City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (rent control and vacancy control law for
mobile homes); Rent Stabilization Ass'n of New York City, Inc. v. Dinkins, 805 F. Supp. 159
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (establishment of mandatory annual rent increase guidelines); Cope v. City of
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Legislation was also sustained that limited' or prohibited' 2 the
future use of existing property, imposed on the party a future duty or
Cannon Beach, 855 P.2d 1083 (Or. 1993) (ordinance prohibiting transient occupancy); Margola
Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 854 P.2d 23 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (requirement that rental units be
registered and fees paid), and a requirement that an additional bond be posted, see Universal
Equip. Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 839 P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1992) (additional bond to
insure reclamation of mine site). Sometimes a condition subsequent can be imposed on a private
party's ability to withdraw from a relevant market. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 644-46
(increased liability if employer withdraws from pension plan); In re "Plan for Orderly
Withdrawal from New Jersey" of Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 609 A.2d 1248 (N.J. 1992) (stating
that insurer must comply with automobile insurance reform act during its five-year withdrawal
from the state market).
121. See Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344 (Ist Cir. 1994) (revocation of building permits
reducing size of project); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1974) (clean air
plan requiring a 25 percent reduction in the number of available employee parking spaces);
Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Army Corps cease and desist
order stops planned development); McKinley v. United States, 828 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.M. 1993)
(reduction in number of cattle permitted to graze on allotment located in national forest); Brown
v. City of Twin Falls, 855 P.2d 876 (Idaho 1993) (placement of road median barriers by city
and state restrained business traffic flow to landowner s property). But see County of Anoka v.
Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 60-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (owner's loss of access to highway
resulting from installation of median could be compensable taking of property).
The most drastic limit placed on an existing property interest is a law imposing a
moratorium on the property's future use or development. A moratorium is usually valid. See
Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs of Jay County, 57 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1995) (moratorium on
landfills); Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1994) (temporary water
moratorium); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1993) (temporary
moratorium on construction in an area pending completion of a study); 767 Third Ave. Assocs.,
48 F.3d at 1577 (lessor lost rent upon federal closure of offices of foreign government);
Herrington v. City of Pearl, 908 F. Supp. 418, 424-26 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (moratorium on new
mobile home sales establishments); Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp.
1316 (D. Nev. 1992) (temporary moratorium on issuance of building permits); Williams v. City
of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (moratorium on special use permits); Sun Ridge
Dev., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 787 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1990) (temporary moratorium on
construction in residential subdivision); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. United Transp. Union,
822 F. Supp. 797, 802-03 (D.D.C. 1991) (stating that Congress can regulate pre-existing
moratoria agreements). But see Adamson Companies v. City of Malibu, 854 F. Supp. 1476,
1491 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (three year moratorium imposed by rent control law violative of due
process).
A law can also produce future changes in the relevant method of calculating the following
values: pre-enactment salaries, see Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d
1012 (4th Cir. 1993) (salary reductions), lease reimbursements, see Anco, Inc. v. State Health &
Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 388 S.E.2d 780, 786-87 (S.C. 1989) (new reimbursement policy
for nursing homes under Medicaid state plan), utility rates, see Town of Norwood v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm., 53 F.3d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (future rates can reflect past
costs when it was always planned to charge future ratepayers for these costs); Marshall County
Bd. ofEduc. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1176 (lth Cir. 1993) (increased
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liability for actions that took place in the past," changed in the future
the legal classification of a private interest,'24 or applied a new
requirement to pending claims and actions."5
rates in proportion to the cost of debt service bonds), royalties, see Western Energy Co. v.
United States Dep't of Interior, 932 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1991); Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership
v. United States Dep't of Interior, 931 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1991) (method of calculating royalty
payment); Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987), and taxes, see
Mostowy v. United States, 966 F.2d 668, 670-71 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (income subject to varying
tax treatment when tax laws change).
122. A law may prohibit the future use of existing property by: forbidding one use of a
private party's property, see National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124,
1129-30 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that ordinance forbidding sale of spray paint within city limits
does not violate store owner's substantive due process rights); Marrero Garcia v. Irizarry, 829 F.
Supp. 523 (D.P.R. 1993) (utility may disconnect service to condominium residents who are not
subscribers); Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068, 1079
(M.D.N.C. 1992) (ordinance prohibiting all commercial off-premises advertising signs);
Boulder City v. Cinnamon Hills Assocs., 871 P.2d 320 (Nev. 1994) (denial of building permit
to construct senior housing project); Unit Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd.,
898 P.2d 1275 (Okla. 1995) (same); Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water
Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 633-34 (Tex. 1996) (law forbidding depletion of
underground aquifer), all uses of private property that produce a harmful effect, see Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (state law may prohibit coal
mining that causes subsidence damage), M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (federal law can forbid coal mining causing subsidence), or virtually all uses of the
property by denial of a permit, see Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.
1992) (denying land use permit on ground that development would impair deer habitat); 1902
At. Ltd. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 575 (Cl. Ct. 1992) (denying Clean Water Act permit to
discharge dredged or fill material due to presence of wetlands). But see Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
123. CERCLA strict liability may be applied retroactively. See United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co.,
810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F.
Supp. 651 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn.
1996); Nevada Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 692-704 (D. Nev. 1996);
American Color & Chem. Corp. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 945, 960 (D.S.C.
1995); Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 790-1 (D.N.J.
1989); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 556 (W.D.N.Y.
1988); United States v. Robin & Haas Co., 669 F. Supp. 672, 676-77 (D.N.J. 1987) (applying
the CERCLA amendments retroactively); see also Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552
(8th Cir. 1984) (stating that state law may change the applicable duty of care owed under a lease
from a negligence standard to a strict liability standard); Petropoulos v. Columbia Gas of Ohio,
Inc., 840 F. Supp. 511, 515 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that the Solid Waste Disposal Act may
apply retroactively); The Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Ind.
1991) (applying state underground storage tank laws retroactively); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc.,
739 F. Supp. 57, 64-65 (D.N.H. 1990) (holding state environmental cleanup discharge before
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C. Continued Invalidity of Primary Retroactivity
Although courts upheld most of the Twentieth Century legislation
that applied with secondary retroactivity, courts generally invalidated
laws that altered the past legal consequences of past action. Such
primary retroactivity was thought to be especially harsh, and usually
void, since the new rule did not merely affect past transactions; it also
changed what the law was in the past when these transactions
occurred. Unlike secondary retroactivity, which has an exclusively
future effect on past transactions, primary retroactivity alters the past
legal consequences of past private behavior. Consequently,
legislation that operates with primary retroactivity violates two
enactment of law); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1067, 1071-72 (D.N.J. 1981)
(holding that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act may be applied retroactively); New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 163 (N.J. 1983) (applying
New Jersey Spill Act to hazardous waste spills occurring before passage of the Act).
In Concrete Pipe, the Supreme Court found a federal statute that increased an employer's
liability from 30% to 46% of its net worth upon withdrawal from a benefit plan an acceptable
form of secondary retroactivity. See 508 U.S. 602 (1993); see also Usery v. Turner Elkhom
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding retroactive effect of federal law imposing liability on
coal mine employers for employee disabilities caused by black lung disease); Holland v.
Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that Coal Act may impose a
new obligation based on past acts); Carbon Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124, 1137 (4th
Cir. 1996) (upholding imposition of new duties on existing contract); In re Chateaugay Corp.,
53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding retroactive provisions of the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act requiring coal operators to pay health benefits to retirees); Barrick Gold
Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, 47 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of 1992 may apply retroactively). A legislature may also impose an
additional duty on a licensee. See Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the legislature can impose additional educational requirements on acupuncturists who have
already obtained licenses).
124. Marusic Liquors, Inc. v. Daley, 55 F.3d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1995) (changing the terms
of an existing liquor license); Park Ave. Tower Assocs. v. City of New York, 746 F.2d 135 (2d
Cir. 1984) (reducing the maximum allowed floor area ratio); Elias v. Town of Brookhaven, 783
F. Supp. 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (changing zoning restrictions from commercial to residential).
125. See Swanson v. Babbitt, 3 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that enactment of
Sawtooth National Recreation Area Act precludes issuance of patents after the Act's effective
date even though applications were pending on effective date); United States v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 669 F. Supp. 672, 676 (D.N.J. 1987) (amendments to CERCLA may apply to litigation
pending at the time of the amendments' enactment); Citizens For Equity v. New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 599 A.2d 516 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (imposing a sale requirement
to prove value diminution on pending claims created only future effects and was therefore
permissible secondary retroactivity).
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fundamental jurisprudential principles: (1) persons should not be
penalized in the past for making decisions in good faith reliance on
rules in effect at the time the decision was made,'26 and (2) the legal
effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that
existed when the conduct took place.2
7
Primary retroactivity usually occurs in two ways. First, the
legislative body can adopt a new law that deprives a private party of a
past valuable benefit by declaring as void the past legal basis for the
benefit.' 2 Second, the new law may impose a penalty or burden on
past private action.'29 In both situations, the fact that the law operates
126. See generally FULLER, supra note 6, at 53.
127. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 494 U.S. at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Examples of this kind of invalid primary retroactivity include enactment of a statute
which deprives a company of distributions of money already made under a pre-enactment
contract, see In re Workers' Compensation Refund W. Nat'l Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 813, 818-19 (8th
Cir. 1995), reinterpretation of an ordinance to reflect an earlier termination date of an approved
development plan than was previously represented, see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of
Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536 (1 Ith Cir. 1994), cancellation of a previously valid permit, see
NRG Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 51 (CI. Ct. 1991) (holding that cancellation of mineral
prospecting permit was an unconstitutional taking); but see Achtien v. City of Deadwood, 814
F. Supp. 808, 815-16 (D.S.D. 1993) (city can rescind previously-issued building permit if the
city believes it was illegal at the time of issuance), recission of a previously acceptable buy-out
rule, see State ex rel. Reider's, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 549 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio Ct
App. 1988), denial of an award of benefits to which the recipient was otherwise entitled, see
O'Reilly v. Town of Glocester, 621 A.2d 697, 705 (RI. 1993); Guerrero v. Adult & Family
Servs. Div., 676 P.2d 928 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (under former rule agency had discretion to
reimburse), and nullification of an otherwise valid judgment, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 1447, 1460 (1995) (holding that Congress may not subject an earlier judgment to a
reopening requirement that did not exist when the judgment was announced); Arbour v.
Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding Westfall Act because it only applies to
cases not yet final); Burch v. Monroe, 834 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
129. For example, a new law may seek to make past conduct subject to (1) disciplinary
action, see Jordan v. Department of Prof'l Regulation, 522 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988), (2) higher taxes, see Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927) (holding that gift tax may
not apply to gifts made prior to enactment), (3) third party approval, see United Nuclear Corp.
v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990), or (4) less favorable rates, See South Cent.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 594 So. 2d 357 (La. 1992). However, if rates are
increased in the future to recover costs incurred in the past, the rate change is not primarily, but
secondarily, retroactive and therefore valid. See Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall
County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171 (11th Cir. 1993). But see City of Piqua v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm., 610 F.2d 950, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that if a utility includes an
estimate of costs in its rates which is subsequently found to be too low, it cannot adjust future
rates to recoup past losses).
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with primary retroactivity is generally sufficient, by itself, to
invalidate it.
Courts will uphold laws that are primary retroactive in rare
instances. A new law may be given primary retroactive effect when
doing so is necessary to protect private rights otherwise adversely
affected by past inequitable behavior of other private parties.'
Primary retroactivity is also generally acceptable when the new law
does not impose new past liability on past action but merely changes
the amount of damages available or taxes due.' Courts view
imposing a new past liability on individuals as a substantive change
and therefore impermissible,'32 but generally allow retroactive
modification of damages or tax on the theory that they are remedial in
nature. 3 For primary retroactive legislation to be impermissible, the
legislation must change past legal consequences; it is not enough that
the legislation has a marketplace effect that adversely affects the past
decisions of private parties.'34
130. See, e.g., Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 228-29 (Utah 1991)
("If ... an operator of a well engages in inequitable conduct by wrongfully delaying an
application for a [well] spacing order, thereby prejudicing another's correlative right, the Board
may make appropriate adjustments as to the date the pooling order is effective. That is, a
pooling order may be made effective prior to the entry of a spacing order. . ").
131. See, e.g., United States v. Stocker, 798 F. Supp. 531, 534-35 (E.D. Wis. 1992)
(concluding that retroactive application of damages provision merely affects the amount of
damages not any substantive law).
132. See Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1992); see
also Stocker, 798 F. Supp. at 535.
133. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994) (characterizing retroactive tax
legislation as curative); Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337, 1345 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that removal of a punitive damages cap is applicable retroactively). But see Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at
1462 ("[R]eliance on the vaguely remedial purpose of a statute to defeat the presumption
against retroactivity [has been] rejected .. ") (internal citations omitted).
134. In Armour & Co. v. Inver Grove Heights, a property owner unsuccessfully claimed
that past planning activities of the city had "taken" his property by making it less attractive to
potential buyers. 2 F.3d 276 (8th Cir. 1993). See also Marietta Realty, Inc. v. Springfield
Redevelopment Auth., 902 F. Supp. 310 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that authority's failure to
fulfill its public announcement of its intent to acquire private property is not a taking of that
property).
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IV. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROACTIVE SUBSTANTIVE
LEGISLATION AND THE MODERN ERA DEFINITION OF
RETROACTIVITY
The precise holding of the Landgraf Court is that when a
legislature has not made its intention known about whether a statute
is to be applied retroactively, its substantive provisions will only be
given prospective effect."' The resulting presumption against
legislative retroactivity may be rebutted with "clear legislative
intent."' 36 Perhaps more importantly, Landgraf also adopts a
definition of retroactivity that requires the presumption to apply only
to statutes whose legal effect satisfies the Wheeler test.'37 The
Wheeler test not only encompasses retroactivity which is
secondary,' but also statutes which impair existing rights, increase
135. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 267-73 (1994). See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Anderson v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
absent legislative intent to the contrary, statutes do not operate retroactively); James Cable
Partners, L.P. v. City of Jamestown, 43 F.3d 277, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the 1992
Cable Act applies prospectively only because the statute lacks strong and imperative language
requiring retroactive application); United States v. AM Gen. Corp., 34 F.3d 472, 474-75 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the EPA cannot collaterally attack a permit by bringing a civil penalty
action many years after the permit had been granted, when no indication that Congress meant to
authorize such retroactive application of the Clean Air Act); Powell v. New York, 869 F. Supp.
106, 112-13 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 does
not apply retroactively to claims accruing before its effective date); Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d
1058, 1061-62 (Utah 1995) (holding that legislative extension of a civil statute of limitations
cannot be applied retroactively in the absence of legislative intent).
136. "Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the
potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to
pay for the countervailing benefits." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73. Compare United States v.
$814,254.76 in U.S. Currency, 51 F.3d 207, 212 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that lack of clear
congressional intent requires application of default rule against retroactivity), with Stattin v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 883 F. Supp. 678, 683-84 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding legislative intent
rebutted presumption against retroactivity).
137. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States ex rel. Schumer, the Court noted that the Wheeler-Landgraf definition of retroactivity
was a "sufficient," but not a "necessary" condition, to the presumption against retroactivity. 117
S. Ct. 1871, 1876 (1997). After Hughes Aircraft, more functional conceptions of retroactivity
can trigger the presumption.
138. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267-70 ("[T]he court must ask whether the new provision
attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment"); Mills v. Amoco
Performance Prods., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 975, 985 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (concluding that in a claim
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liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
completed transactions.'39 As a result, even when private parties
cannot establish that their pre-enactment conduct has achieved
protected legal status, a court may refuse to apply a statute
retroactively if the legislature does not explicitly demand that effect.
A. Presumptive Legislative Prospectivity
1. Genesis of and Justifications for the Presumption
Prior to Landgraf, there was much uncertainty about whether
courts should apply new legislation retroactively or prospectively
when there was no guiding legislative intent. The confusion was
caused by what the Supreme Court identified as an "apparent
tension" between two lines of cases. 40 One line of Supreme Court
cases-United States v. -Schooner Peggy,' Thorpe v. Housing
Authority of Durham,142  and Bradley v. School Board of
Richmond'43-seemed to establish a general presumption in favor of
legislative retroactivity. The Bradley Court articulated "the principle
that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time of the decision."'
14
The second line of cases culminated in the 1988 case Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital,45 where the Court flatly stated that
"[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law."'46 In 1990, some members
of the Court described this conflict as an "irreconcilable
contradiction." '147
comprising both pre-enactment and post-enactment conduct, the Landgrafpresumption applies
to prevent retroactive application of new damages provision to any pre-enactment conduct).
139. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
140. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 494 U.S. at 837.
141. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103 (1801).
142. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
143. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
144. Id. at711.
145. 488 U.S. 204,208 (1988).
146. Id. at 208. The Court had articulated a similar view in United States v. Security
Industrial Bank 459 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1982).
147. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 494 U.S. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The confusion between the two seemingly contradictory
presumptions led to judicial opinions by lower courts which tended to
"rely upon [the] conflicting precedent to reach equally conflicting
results."'48 The conflict was particularly evident in cases involving
the Civil Rights Act of 199 1. The purposes of the 1991 Act were to
strengthen the federal civil rights laws 5° and to provide additional
remedies for claims alleging civil rights violations.' Congress
148. James v. American Int'l Recovery, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1156, 1162 (N.D. Ga. 1992). See
Wright v. Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 913 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir.
1990) (stating that Bradley's presumption in favor of retroactivity created a dramatic shift in the
law of retroactivity). Compare, e.g., United States v. Stocker, 798 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Wis.
1992) (allowing retroactive application of the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act), with
United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that district court erred in
applying False Claims Act amendments retroactively), and Thomas v. Frank, 791 F. Supp. 470,
476 (D.N.J. 1992) (stating that legislation which imposes unforeseen obligations on pre-
legislation conduct should not be applied retroactively).
149 For example, the Ninth Circuit found that the 1991 Act applies retroactively. See
Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1993); Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976
F2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Accord Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Coulter v. Newmont Gold Co., 799 F. Supp. 1071 (D. Nev. 1992); Jaekel v. Equifax
Mktg. Decision Sys., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Va. 1992); Tyler v. Pennsylvania Dep't of
Revenue, 793 F. Supp. 98 (M.D. Pa. 1992); Robinson v. Davis Memorial Goodwill Indus., 790
F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1992); Sample v. Keystone Carbon Co., 786 F. Supp. 527 (W.D. Pa.
1992); United States v. Department of Mental Health, 785 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Cal. 1992);
Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Sanders v. Culinary
Workers Union Local No. 226, 783 F. Supp. 531 (D. Nev. 1992); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
Other jurisdictions and courts, however, concluded that the 1991 Act should only apply
prospectively. See Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Valdez v.
San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, 974 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1992); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr.,
973 F.2d 1263, 1267 (5th Cir. 1992); Wilson v. Belmont Homes, Inc., 970 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.
1992); Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Uncles Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d
1363 (5th Cir. 1992); Holt v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 974 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1992);
Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992); Banas v. American Airlines, 969
F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1992); Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992);
Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992); Davis v. Tri-
State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1992); Huey v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 1362 (8th
Cir. 1992); Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1992); Hicks v. Brown Group,
Inc., 982 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1992); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.
1992); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 983 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993); Baynes v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d 1370 (11 th Cir. 1992).
150. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (purposes
of the amendments).
151. See Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994); Douglas
W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional, Statutory, and Philosophical Enigma,
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enacted the 1991 Act in response to a 1989 Supreme Court decision
which limited the remedies available for various civil rights
violations. 52  The 1991 Act expanded the definition of an
employment contract, 5 1 for which damages could be claimed if
discrimination was proven, and provided for jury trials, 54 additional
damage claims, 155 and witness fees. 5 6 Most of the Act's provisions
were to be effective on the date the Act was passed, but the language
was unclear as to whether they should apply retroactively or
prospectively.
51
Most lower courts tended to adopt the Bowen presumption of
prospectivity that was eventually adopted in Landgraf The rationales
offered by these courts included the following: (1) the traditional and
historic rule of construction that legislation must be addressed to the
future, and therefore, a statute should not be given retrospective
operation interfering with antecedent rights; 58 (2) the fear that if the
enormous power of the legislature can be applied to past (as well as
future) conduct, it might "produce massive dislocations in ongoing
litigation and defeat [reasonable] reliance interests";5 9 and (3) the
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (1993); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923 (1993); Thamer E. Temple I, Retroactivity of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act in Title VII Cases, 43 LABOR L.J 299 (1992).
152. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994).
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
157. See Temple, supra note 151.
158. See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); United States v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-64 (1928); Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d
1370, 1374 (11th Cir. 1992); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929,
935 (7th Cir. 1992); Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 963-64 n.6 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1390 (10th Cir.
1990); Sargisson v. United States, 913 F.2d 918, 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Tyger Constr. Co. v.
United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 35, 49-50 (Fed. Cl. 1993); cf Ficarra v. Department of Regulatory
Agencies, 849 P.2d 6 (Colo. 1993).
159. Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1992), quoted in
Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 982 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that when Congress
"overrules" a Supreme Court decision it is not necessarily "restoring" the prior law, and
therefore is not interfering with reliance interests; rather, it is laying down a new rule of conduct
for the future).
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common sense notion implicit in Bowen that persons should be able
to "conform their present conduct to existing rules of law without the
risk of retrospective liability.'1 6
The Landgraf presumption of prospectivity for new legislation
appears to be a correct resolution of the Bradley-Bowen conflict.161
As a matter of history and tradition, prospective application for
legislation has been the rule among courts. 62 Prospective application
of legislation and is based on ancient Roman and English common
law. 63 It is also in accord with over 150 years of American tradition
through countless judicial rulings,"6  and state constitutional
prohibitions against retroactive legislation. 165  By contrast, a
presumption of legislative retroactivity runs completely contrary to
this well-established history; indeed, Bradley's presumption of
160. Baynes, 976 F.2d at 1373. See also Simmons v. Lockhart, 931 F.2d 1226, 1230 (8th
Cir. 1991) (stating that the role of legislatures is to set rules to govern future conduct); Kemp v.
Flygt Corp., 791 F. Supp. 48, 50-51 (D. Conn. 1992); Khandelwal v. Compuadd Corp., 780 F.
Supp. 1077, 1080-81 (E.D. Va. 1992). Some lower courts adopted Bowen partly because it was
the more recent Supreme Court case. See Tyree v. Riley, 783 F. Supp. 877, 892 (D.N.J. 1992).
161. When legislative intent on the issue of retroactivity is missing, post-Landgraf cases
have had no difficulty in interpreting new substantive statutes so prospectively. See, e.g., United
States v. $814,254.76 in U.S. Currency, 51 F.3d 207, 212 (9th Cir. 1995); Carter v. Sedgwick
County, 36 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 1994); Simons v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., 28 F.3d
1029, 1031-33 (10th Cir. 1994); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 368 (3d Cir. 1994).
However, courts will apply non-substantive changes to pre-enactment conduct. See Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1388 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that
because the Act did not impose substantive changes, its application was not considered
retroactive); cf Rodriguez v. General Motors Corp., 27 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the presumption of prospectivity only applies to substantive changes); Mills v. Amoco
Performance Prods., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 975, 985 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
162. See Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929,935-36 (7th Cir.
1992); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990);
Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 964 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Sargisson v.
United States, 913 F.2d 918, 922-23 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Kemp Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp.,
857 F. Supp. 373, 396 (D.N.J. 1994); Raya v. Maryatt Indus., 829 F. Supp. 1169, 1172-73
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Stout v. IBM Corp., 798 F. Supp. 998, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
163. Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1374 (8th Cir. 1992).
164. See, e.g., Gersrnan v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Alpo Pefoodr, 913 F.2d at 964 n.6; Tyree, 783 F. Supp. at 881; Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 12.
165. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 1 X; IDAHO CONST. art.
XL § 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 23; OHIO CONST. art. I1, § 28; TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 20; TEX. CONST. art I, § 16.
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retroactivity has been judicially described as a "brief and inexplicable
excursion from the long-standing norm."
166
The Supreme Court cases that have been traditionally cited as
justifying a presumption of retroactivity-Schooner Peggy, Thorpe,
and Bradley-are in fact easily reconcilable with the presumption of
prospectivity for substantive legislative changes. In Schooner Peggy,
the Court applied a treaty to a case pending on appeal because the
1671nta aelanguage of the treaty commanded such retroactivity. In that case,
the presumption of prospective application had been rebutted by clear
legislative intent. 16 In Thorpe, retroactivity was justifiable because
the change involved the imposition of a new notice and hearing
requirement. 169 Prospective application was not warranted in Thorpe
because the change fell within the exception for purely non-
substantive, procedural alterations of existing law. 7 Bradley
involved a statute that allowed a federal court to grant reasonable
attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in certain cases. 171 Because
applying the attorneys' fees provisions would not result in manifest
injustice and there was no congressional intent to the contrary, the
Bradley Court held that the new attorney's fee provision could be
applied retroactively. 72
Even if Schooner Peggy-Thorpe-Bradley were not such tenuous
precedent, a presumption of prospectivity should still have
commanded the Court's support simply because it is the "better
rule.""7 Presumptive prospectivity provides persons otherwise
affected by new legislation with fixed, predictable standards at the
time persons contemplate conduct, 74 which allows market actors to
166. McLaughlin v. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 971 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). See also James v.
American Int'l Recovery, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1156, 1189 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (stating that Bradley
represents an unprecedented departure).
167. See Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110.
168. See id.
169. See Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 282-83.
170. See id.
171. See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 710.
172. See id. at 711-21.
173. See Simmons v. Lockhart, 931 F.2d 1226, 1230 (8th Cir. 1991).
174. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1994); Luddington, 966
F.2d at 229.
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make decisions with more complete information about applicable
rules. Prospectivity is more fair because persons know before they act
what the likely legal consequences of those actions will be, which
allows them to avoid conduct that is unlawful.175 A presumption
against retroactivity better preserves the distinction between courts
and legislatures: the former act retroactively, settling disputes
between persons by application of pre-existing law; the latter act
prospectively, setting the general rules of future conduct. 76
2. The LandgrafRule
After Landgraf, a presumption of prospectivity applies for
legislation affecting conduct or legal interests arising prior to the
effective date of the new statute. The temporal event which controls
the prospective application of the new law is private party conduct,
which may have (but need not have) created a pre-enactment legal
interest.'77 Prospectivity is not rebutted when the private party's prior
interests are subject to the filing of a lawsuit, or the pendency of an
appeal, at the time of the new law's adoption."' This rule of
presumed prospectivity is triggered when four conditions are present.
First, the legislature must not have revealed its intent about
whether the new statute is to apply retroactively or prospectively.
When the legislature expresses a "clear intent" that the legislation is
retroactive, the presumption is rebutted.'79 Although there is some
175. See Baynes, 976 F.2d at 1373; Gersman, 975 F.2d at 897; Mozee, 963 F.2d at 936;
Wright, 913 F.2d at 1574; Criger v. Becton, 902 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1990).
176. See Hicks, 982 F.2d at 298; Simmons, 931 F.2d at 1230; American Int'l Recovery, 799
F. Supp. at 1196.
177. See Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524,527,530 (5th Cir. 1995).
178. See Rivers, 511 U.S. at 311 (holding that the presumption applies even though an
appeal was pending when statute became law); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc., 7 F.3d
795, 797 (8th Cir. 1993); Mojica v. Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1993). Conversely,
the Landgraf rule is not limited just to cases pending when the new law became effective. See
Ventre v. Johnson, No. 93-2535,39 F.3d 1179, 1994 WL 589618 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 1994).
179. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273, 280, 286 (1994); Mayes v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 37 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that the presumption against
retroactive statutes can be overcome when Congress intends for retroactivity); Rebel Motor
Freight, Inc. v. Freeman Drywall Co., 914 F. Supp. 1516, 1522 (W.D. Tenn. 1994); Petropoulos
v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 511,515 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Vashon Island Comm.
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confusion about whether this first step can be satisfied by evidence of
legislative intent other than an express statutory command, 180 the
better rule is that the legislature manifests a clear intent only when
the face of the statute "requires retroactivity,''. or when the statute
contains an "express command" that it be retroactive. 2 If the statute
is silent on the issue of retroactivity, and the legislative history is at
all ambiguous, the presumption applies. 3 If the statute expressly
requires prospectivity, the presumption is not necessary.'
for Self-Government v. Washington State Boundary Review Bd., 903 P.2d 953, 959 (Wash.
1995) (en banc) ("A statute may be applied retroactively if the Legislature intended such a
result."). If the legislature intends for a provision of a law to apply to pending trials, then courts
abide by this intent, especially if the law involves non-substantive changes. See Ex parte
Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71 (1949) (new rule defining forum non conveniens); Sancho v. Texas Co.,
308 U.S. 463,467 (1940) (new method of enforcing awards).
180. Compare, e.g., Reyes-Hemandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490,492 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
presumption against retroactivity exists "unless the statute provides explicitly for retroactive
application"), Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 538 (1st Cir. 1995)
(requiring clear statutory language demanding retroactivity), and Chenault v. United States
Postal Serv., 37 F.3d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1994) (same), with Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415,
419 (10th Cir. 1996) (considering both the language of the act and the legislative history in
search of "unambiguous directive"), Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250,
1270 (Ist Cir. 1996) (holding that legislative history "left no doubt" that retroactivity was
contemplated), and United States v. $814,254.76 in U.S. Currency, 51 F.3d 207, 212 (9th Cir.
1995) (considering legislative history for evidence of "clear congressional intent" to apply
statute retroactively).
181. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 270,272-73, 280; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204, 208 (1988); Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); United States v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1928) ("Statutes are not to be given retroactive
effect... unless the legislative purpose so to do plainly appears.'); Downer v. United States
Dep't of Agric. & Soil Conservation Serv., 894 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (D.S.D. 1995), aff'd 97
F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1996).
182. See United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806); Hot, Sexy & Safer
Prods., 68 F.3d at 538.
183. See Sparks v. Craft, 75 F.3d 257,262 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that when no evidence of
whether the legislature intended any purpose that requires retroactive application, then
prospectivity governs); Caddell v. Department of Justice, 96 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 947 F. Supp. 180, 186 (W.D. Pa. 1996); Hassen v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1996).
184. See Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1494-96 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding congressional
intent that evidenced a wish that the statute apply prospectively); Santa Fe Energy Prods. Co. v.
McCutcheon, 90 F.3d 409, 413 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that royalty rules were intended to
apply prospectively); Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 588 (5th Cir. 1995)
(stating that the ADA was not intended to be retroactive); Oswald v. LaRoche Chems., Inc., 894
F. Supp. 988, 992 (E.D. La. 1995).
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Second, the presumption only applies to substantive changes.18 5
Changes characterized as procedural, jurisdictional, remedial,
clarifying, or curative may be retroactive.1 6 If the legislature seeks to
avoid the presumption simply by labeling the change as non-
substantive, a court may look behind the label to see if the change, in
effect, imposes new penalties or damages liability for past private
behavior. In such a case, prospectivity controls despite the
legislature's attempt to characterize the statute as non-substantive.187
The impact of such new penalty provisions on parties' existing rights
may be particularly harsh and pronounced, therefore justifying
application of the presumption.
Third, the presumption has greatest applicability to statutes which
would, but for the presumption, be secondarily retroactive-they
would alter the future legal consequences of past private action,
particularly where retroactive application would otherwise impose an
unanticipated liability. 8 The presumption is typically not needed to
185. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 278; United States v. Bacon, 82 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir.
1996) (stating that statute that affects a right to bring an action in court is substantive); Hyatt v.
Northrop Corp., 80 F.3d 1425, 1430-31 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a statute that defined
additional conduct as unlawful was substantive); Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d
524, 527 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the determination of when a cause of action accrues is
substantive); Caddell, 96 F.3d at 1371 (stating that substantive change triggers the presumption
if law attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment).
186. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 117 S. Ct. 1871, 1878
(1997) (limiting the definition of "jurisdictional" to statutes affecting where a suit may be
brought, not whether it may be brought at all); Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274-80, 285 n.37; Thorpe
v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (procedural); Hunter v. United States, 101
F.3d 1565, 1572-73 (1 Ith Cir. 1996) (procedural); Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 116-
17 (1952) (jurisdictional); Williams v. Stegall, 945 F. Supp. 145, 147-48 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(jurisdictional); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 907 F. Supp.
1349, 1356-57 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (jurisdictional); Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S.
696 (1974) (remedial); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 312 n.8 (1945)
(remedial); Bayless v. Community College Dist. No. XIX, 927 P.2d 254, 257 (Wash. Ct. App.
1996) (remedial); Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 379 (1940) (curative);
United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370, 385-86 (1907) (curative).
187. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280-86; United States v. $814,254.76 in U.S. Currency, 51
F.3d 207, 212 (9th Cir. 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaForet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61
(FIa. 1995).
188. See, e.g., Brown v. Secretary of the Army, 78 F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying the presumption to statute waiving sovereign immunity, where retroactivity would
impose on the United States a liability to which it has not explicitly consented).
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overcome primary retroactivity, because legislation which alters the
past legal consequences of past private action is usually
impermissible regardless of legislative intent.'89
Fourth, the presumption of prospectivity is not needed simply
because the new statute draws upon antecedent facts for its
operation, 9 ' is applied in a case arising from pre-enactment
conduct,' 9' or upsets expectations based in prior law. 92 These kinds
of changes do not operate with what will be termed "true
retroactivity."' 93 Indeed, when the precipitating event for a statute's
application occurs after the effective date of the statute, the statute is
often deemed to apply prospectively, even though the precipitating
event had its origin in a factual context existing prior to the statute's
enactment. 94
A statute has a truly retroactive effect sufficient to trigger the
presumption when it satisfies both (1) the Landgraf definition of
189. See, eg., Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. CL 1447, 1456 (1995) (invalidating a
statute that "prescribes what the law was at an earlier time, when the act whose effect is
controlled by the legislature occurred" despite clear expression of legislative intent); O'Reilly v.
Town of Glocester, 621 A.2d 697, 705 (R.IL 1993). See also supra notes 128-29 and
accompanying text.
190. See Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 449 (1934); Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427,
435 (1922); In re Estate of Ryan, 928 P.2d 735, 737 (Ariz. Ct App. 1996).
191. See Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 99-102 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part).
192. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269; Lieberman-Sack v. Harvard Community Health Plan
of New England, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 249, 255 (D.R.I. 1995) (stating that the fact that legislation
changes expectations about the extent of liability is an insufficient basis to strike the law as
impermissibly retroactive).
193. A true retroactive effect is what the Landgraf opinion referred to as a "truly
'retrospective' application of a statute." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 279-80 (using the Wheeler test
for ascertaining if a law is retroactive). See also Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1570-
72 (11th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Anderson v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810,
813-14 (9th Cir. 1995); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1388
(11 th Cir. 1994); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1994); Templeton Coal Co.
v. Shalala, 882 F. Supp. 799, 813 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Gilbert v. Milliken & Co., 836 F. Supp. 856,
858 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth., 859 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Okla. 1993);
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,253 (Utah 1988).
194. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331, 1337 (10th
Cir. 1986) (stating that where statute applies to contracts issued or renewed after the effective
date of the statute, the statute is not retroactive, even though the original contract may pre-dated
the statute); Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 912 F. Supp. 261, 266 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (same);
In re Estate of Bums, 904 P.2d 301, 303-04 (WVash. Ct. App. 1995).
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secondary retroactivity, and (2) the Wheeler definition of
retroactivity. The Landgraf definition of secondary retroactivity is
met and a law exhibits "true retroactivity," only when legislation
attaches a new legal consequence to a pre-enactment event. Removal
of discretionary power to relieve a person from a burden imposed by
pre-enactment conduct is not a new legal consequence. 5 Under the
Wheeler definition, readopted in Landgraf, a new statute is truly
retroactive if it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or
attaches liability for past conduct." (The substantive content of these
definitional conditions to true retroactivity will be fully explored in
Part V). Secondarily retroactive statutes which have these
consequences operate with true retroactivity, and therefore, they are
subject to the presumption of prospectivity, unless a contrary
legislative intent is evident.
These four conditions to a successful invocation of the
presumption of prospectivity are summarized below in Figure 3.
195 See Hunter, 101 F.3d at 1570-1572 (holding that amended statute governing appeals
in pending habeas corpus and post-conviction relief proceedings applied to habeas cases is not a
change that applies with true retroactivity because it does not increase a party's liability for past
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to past transactions); Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d
751, 766 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that new standards of review for habeas applicant not truly
retroactive because they do not increase liability for past conduct); Samaniego-Meraz v. INS, 53
F.3d 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that repeal of discretionary relief from deportation is not
a retroactive act).
196. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, the Court noted that the
Wheeler definition described a "sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition" for invoking the
presumption against retroactivity. 117 S. Ct. 1871, 1876 (1997) (emphasis in original). Most
courts, including Hughes Aircraft, still rely on Wheeler. See United States v. $814,254.76 in
U.S. Currency, 51 F.3d 207, 210 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that presumption applies when new
statute "significantly increases liability"); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Officemax, Inc., 949 F.
Supp. 409 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act may not be
applied retroactively because it imposes new duties); Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.
947 F. Supp. 180, 186 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that a federal law might impair rights possessed
by private parties before law enacted, therefore presumption of prospectivity applies to prevent
law from having true retroactive effect); FDIC v. Hinch, 879 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (N.D. Okla.
1995) (stating that the presumption applies if the effect of new statute is to increase liability).
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B. The Modern Era Definition ofRetroactivity
1. Conflicting Roles of a Finding of Retroactivity
For many years there has been dispute over the function of the
term "retroactive." On the one hand, most commentators and some
courts believed that a finding that a law was retroactive to was merely
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/13
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descriptive of the operation of the law, 97 and only the beginning
point of analysis. If a law was deemed retroactive, this finding was
not dispositive of the law's validity; there were other issues that still
needed to be addressed (e.g., the nature of the retroactive impact on
the private party) before one could decide whether the retroactivity
was sufficient to void the law. 9' Under this view, it was important to
define whether a law was retroactive, because satisfaction of that
definition then sets in motion a series of subsequent inquiries about
the law's ultimate validity. If the law was not found to be retroactive,
then additional steps are not necessary.
On the other hand, many courts assumed that finding a law to be
"retroactive" was not the beginning, but rather the end of a process of
analysis. For these courts, a finding that a law was retroactive was
tantamount to a finding that the law was unconstitutional or otherwise
impermissible.'" If these courts believed the challenged law should
not be declared void, they had to conclude that the law was not
retroactive. Courts defined the term "retroactivity" narrowly so that it
would not encompass the law under attack.
197. See, e.g., Hochman, supra note 5, at 692:
A retroactive statute is one which gives to preenactment conduct a different legal
effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the statute. The most
obvious kind of retroactive statute is one which reaches back to attach new legal rights
and duties to already completed transactions. However, a statute may be retro[active]
... which declares preexisting obligations unenforceable in the future.
Id. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,430 (1987).
See Slawson, supra note 5, at 217-18 ("[Retroactivity refers either to] laws that make rights
or duties depend on past events in the narrow sense of dependence on events that have occurred
and terminated before the laws were enacted," or "[to] an effect which occurs when a new law
is imposed on society [which] substantially ... disturb[s] patterns of conduct that represent
substantial investments in labor or property"); Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co.,
231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913); see also Munzer, supra note 5, at 426 ("[R]etroactive legislation...
consists of laws that [(1)] alter the legal status, that is, the legal character or consequences, of
some pre-enactment action or event, [(2)] make a legal judgment regarding that action easier or
harder to obtain, [or (3)] substantially affect expectations stemming from that action.").
198. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (stating that
retroactive legislation requires a greater justification than prospective legislation to satisfy due
process); Kuhn v. State, 924 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Colo. 1996) (stating that a retroactive statute
is not necessarily unconstitutional).
199. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paper Mfg. Co., 753 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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Courts commonly relied on three definitions of retroactivity. First,
legislation was not "retroactive" merely because it applied to conduct
antedating the legislation's enactment." ° Second, legislation was not
retroactive just because it imposed a new duty or liability on past
acts. 2 1' Third, regulation of future action based upon rights previously
acquired by the person regulated was not retroactive.2 2
This approach to retroactivity has several faults. First, it is
conclusory. Simply terming the future operation of backwards-
looking law "non-retroactive" has allowed courts to validate laws
without having to explain why it was not somehow unfair for the
law's operation to rely on pre-enactment facts. also, the three
definitions of retroactivity have not been routinely adopted by all
courts. While some jurisdictions have refused to call legislation
retroactive if the new statute either imposed new duties on past acts
or regulated future actions based on legal rights previously
acquired,2 3 other jurisdictions have deemed laws to be impermissibly
retroactive if the new statute imposed a new duty with respect to past
transactions,2 4 impaired legal rights vested under existing laws, 205 or
applied a penalty to a prior completed act.206
200. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. at 431-33; Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922);
Campos v. INS, 16 F.3d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1994); De Osorio v. INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1042 (4th
Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Faulkner, 991 F.2d 262,266 (5th Cir. 1993); McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of
Massachusetts, 989 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1993); Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund v.
Shalala, 987 F.2d 790, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Gonsalves v. Flynn, 981 F.2d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir.
1992); Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. S & W Petroleum Serv. Inc., 894 F. Supp. 862, 865
(M.D. Pa. 1995); Centigram Communications Corp. v. Lehman, 862 F. Supp. 113, 119 (E.D.
Va. 1994); Howell v. Heim, 882 P.2d 541, 547 (N.M. 1994); Burger v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 77 A.2d 737, 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951); Cook v. Wyoming Oil &
Gas Conservation Comm'n, 880 P.2d 583, 585-86 (Wyo. 1994).
201. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 637; In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 489-91 (2d
Cir. 1995); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir.
1986).
202. See Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 292
U.S. 443, 449 (1934); Pinnock v. Intemational House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp.
574, 584 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
Post-Landgraf, some courts found backwards-applying legislation to be non-retroactive if it
did not bring about any substantive changes. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ford Motor
Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1388 (Ilth Cir. 1994).
203. See supra notes 200-02.
204. See, e.g., Kuhn v. State, 924 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Colo. 1996); Colorado Office of
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2. A New Model of Retroactivity
A better approach is one that makes a finding of retroactivity
neither the beginning nor the end of the analysis. Rather, there may
be as many as four decision points in an analytical process which call
for differing inquiries about the retroactivity issue. At each point a
slightly different definition of retroactivity is employed.
The first inquiry is whether the new statute has prospective or
retroactive effect. If the statute alters the legal consequences of past
(pre-enactment) private action, it has retroactive effect. If it affects
private interests and private conduct arising only post-enactment, it
has only prospective effect.2 7
If it does have retroactive effect, the second step is to ask whether
the statute alters the legal consequences of private action in the past
(pre-enactment), or in the future (post-enactment). If the former, then
the law is an example of primary retroactivity. The Supreme Court
refers to statutes that operate with primary retroactivity as "statutes
... enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their passage,"20
and "legislation that prescribes what the law was at an earlier time,
when the act whose effect is controlled by the legislation
occurred." 2" As noted in Part III, if the retroactivity is primary, the
Consumer Counsel v. Public Serv. Co. of Colorado, 877 P.2d 867, 870 (Colo. 1994); Karl v.
Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 331 N.W.2d 456,463 (Mich. 1982).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 80-82 (1982);
Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 897-98 (6th Cir. 1991);
DeCarion v. Monroe County, 853 F. Supp. 1415, 1419 (S.D. Fla. 1994); cf. Sturges v. Carter,
114 U.S. 511, 519 (1885) (finding a statute to be non-retrospective because "it took away no
vested tight").
206. See. e.g., Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994)
(holding that new punitive damages provisions as punishment constitute a new tight or
entitlement for a plaintiff and cannot be applied retroactively).
207. See, e.g., R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt, 113 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States ex rel. Anderson v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1995).
208. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268 (explaining that retroactivity encompasses more than just
primary retroactivity) (quoting Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156)).
209. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1456 (identifying clearly retroactive legislation) (emphasis in
original).
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analysis usually ends here because the primary retroactivity itself
invalidates the statute.210
If the statute alters only the future legal consequences of past
private action, then it is an example of secondary retroactivity. The
Wheeler court referred to secondary retroactivity when it permitted
the invalidation of statutes which, "though operating only from
[their] passage, affect [past] rights and transactions., 21' One-hundred-
and-eighty years after Wheeler, Landgraf readopted this definition
when it stated that courts "must ask whether the new provision
attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its
enactment. 212 Lower courts concur. While a statute is not retroactive
merely because it draws upon antecedent facts, it is retroactive if it
affects pre-existing rights and legal duties of individuals subject to
the statute."'
If a statute operates in a secondarily retroactive fashion, the next
(and third) inquiry is whether "clear" legislative intent requires this
result.214 When legislative intent is ambiguous, the presumption of
prospectivity becomes relevant. The presumption is applicable only
when the statute is truly retroactive. A statute manifests true
retroactivity when it satisfies the Wheeler-Landgraf definition of
secondary retroactivity-the statute impairs existing vested rights,
creates or imposes a new duty, or attaches or increases liability for
past conduct.21 5 A statute is not considered "truly retroactive" if the
210. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text
211. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767.
212. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70. Wheeler's definition of retroactivity is a sufficient, but
not a necessary, condition for invoking the presumption against retroactivity. See Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 117 S. Ct. 1871, 1876 (1997).
213. See Lennox v. Evans, 87 F.3d 431, 432 (10th Cir. 1996); Porter v. Galameau, 911
P.2d 1143, 1150 (Mont. 1996); Gadsden Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. of Gadsden
Indep. Sch. Dist., 920 P.2d 1052, 1057 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
214. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text. See also Hunter v. United States, 101
F.3d 1565, 1572 (1 1th Cir. 1996) ("Mhe term 'rights' [for retroactivity analysis] should not be
construed broadly so as to sweep within its ambit mere expectation interests under procedural or
remedy rules."); Sechrest v. Ignacio, 943 F. Supp. 1253, 1255 (D. Nev. 1996) (stating that a
statute is retroactive only if its application to a pending case would impair rights an individual
already possessed or increase an individual's liability for past conduct, or would impose new
duties with respect to past actions); Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. S & W Petroleum
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its only retroactive effect is to upset the expectations of private
parties. True retroactivity is present, and the presumption is triggered,
only when (1) legislative intent to proceed retroactively is unclear,
and (2) the statute satisfies the Wheeler-Landgraf definition of
secondary retroactivity.
When the presumption of prospectivity is inapplicable because the
legislature intends for the statute to be secondarily retroactive, the
fourth and final relevant inquiry is not whether the statue applies
retroactively (it does), but whether the retroactivity is permissible.
This inquiry requires a determination of whether the pre-enactment
private conduct or private interest has protected legal status with
respect to the new statute. If it does not, and if the legislature calls for
retroactivity, then the statute may alter the future, post-enactment
legal consequences of the past private action. If the conduct or
interest does have protected legal status, then secondary retroactivity
is forbidden, regardless of legislative wishes.216
This sequence of analysis, which requires up to four definitional
decision points, is illustrated in Figure 4.
Serv., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 862, 865 (M.D. Pa. 1995) ("A law is given retroactive effect when it is
used to impose a new legal burden on a past transaction or occurrence."); Doe v. Abbott Lab.,
892 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. La. 1995) (stating that a law is retroactive when it imposes an
important new legal burden on pro-enactment events).
216. See, e.g., Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1995)
(stating that once a party's cause of action accrues, it becomes a vested right that may not be
retroactively divested regardless of legislative wishes).
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V. DEFEATING INTENTIONAL SECONDARY RETROACTIVITY: THE
CONDITIONS TO PROTECTED LEGAL STATUS
A. The Elements of Protected Legal Status
1. Landgraf Considerations
When a private party's pre-enactment conduct has protected legal
status, even a law which is intended by the legislature to be
secondarily retroactive may not operate to adversely affect these
earlier private actions."' Whether private actions have protected legal
status with respect to laws intended to be secondarily retroactive
depends on what the Landgraf Court calls a "process of judgment"
that considers three factors: (1) the "nature" of the change in the law;
(2) the "extent" of the change in the law; and (3) "the degree of
connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past
event., 218 While the primary function of these three factors is to
determine (in conjunction with the Wheeler definition of
retroactivity) whether a statute operates with "true retroactivity," they
also control whether pre-enactment conduct has achieved protected
legal status. If so, the conduct is immunized from retroactivity even
when the legislature expressly intends for the legislation to be
retroactive.
The first consideration--"the nature of the change in the law"--
focuses on the nature of the legal interest affected by the change.
Protected legal status tends to be conferred on an existing legal
interest either determined to be a "vested right" that would otherwise
be impaired by the new law,219 or a contract right specially protected
217. See Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating
that if a statute reveals Congress' intent that it is to be retroactive, that intent governs unless
such an application would violate the Constitution); Arledge v. Holnam, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 822,
828 (M.D. La. 1996) ("Even if the legislature made the law retroactive, such an effect must be
constitutional."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995)
("Even when the Legislature does expressly state that a statute is to have retroactive application,
this Court has refused to apply the statute retroactively if the statute impairs vested rights,
creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties.").
218. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270.
219. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 892 P.2d 497, 500-01 (Kan. 1995);
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against the change by the Contracts Clause." The Landgraf Court
concurs. Landgraf adopts that portion of the Wheeler test that finds
laws retroactive (often impermissibly so) if they "impair vested rights
acquired under existing laws."'" The opinion also notes that "new
provisions affecting contractual or property rights [are] matters in
which predictability and stability are of prime importance, ' 222 and
that the Contracts Clause "prohibits states from passing...
retroactive.., laws 'impairing the Obligation of Contracts.' 223
The second consideration---"the extent of the change in the
law"--requires reviewing courts to take into account the degree and
kind of impact the changed law has on existing rights. 4 Protected
legal status is most often afforded to property holders where the
extent of change causes property either to be (1) unconstitutionally
"taken" without just compensation, 5 or (2) subject to certain kinds
of new duties or liabilities with respect to past events.226 The
Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 139 P. 879, 896 (Ariz. 1913); Hansen Bros. Enters. v. Board of
Supervisors of Nevada County, 907 P.2d 1324, 1344 (Cal. 1996) (remanding to determine
extent of company's vested rights to mine and quarry its property).
220. See, e.g., Educational Employees Credit Union v. Mutual Guar. Corp., 50 F.3d 1432,
1438-39 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Workers' Compensation Refund W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 46 F.3d
813, 821 (8th Cir. 1995); Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 29 F.3d 383, 385 (8th Cir.
1994). A contract is often seen as a vested right. See Spradling v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue,
870 P.2d 521,523 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
221. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269 (quoting Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 757). The Court
characterizes the Takings Clause as a constitutional protection against legislative attempts to
deprive private persons of "vested property rights." See id. at 266. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia's criticizes the majority opinion's "vested right focus." See id. at 290-93.
222. Id. at271.
223. Id. at 266.
224. The extent of the new liability imposed on pre-enactment conduct was a primary
reason why the LandgrafCourt refused to apply the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act
retroactively. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283-84.
225. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d
1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
226. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304 (1994) (holding that
section 101 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act cannot be retroactive because it imposes "important
new legal obligations" on employers for past acts); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114, 1122
(7th Cir. 1996) (stating that a statute is retroactive which attaches new legal consequences, in
the form of new mandatory payments to a fund, for the act of engaging in some pre-enaetment
conduct); Nickeo v. Virgin Islands Tel. Corp., 42 F.3d 804, 806-07 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 cannot apply retroactively to cases pending at time of enactment of
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Landgraf Court specifically notes that the antiretroactivity principle
is particularly strong with respect to "new provisions affecting...
property rights,"2 7 and that it is the "Takings Clause [which]
prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from
depriving private persons of vested property rights. 228 With respect
to the imposition of new duties or liabilities, both Landgraf and its
companion case, Rivers,229 concluded that the provisions of the 1991
Civil Rights Act under review should be prospective, in large part
because these new provisions substantially increase a party's liability
in the civil context. 0
The third consideration---"the degree of connection between the
operation of the new rule and a relevant past event"--is really an
inquiry about the essential fairness of a secondarily retroactive law.
Private property right-holders have protected legal status with respect
to a new retroactive law if it would be fundamentally "unfair" to
apply the law so as to affect their existing rights." Such fundamental
unfairness is present when secondary retroactivity would be either
inconsistent with due process,232 or barred by an assertion of
the Act, when to do so would increase liability); P-W Invs., Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655
P.2d 1365, 1371 (Colo. 1982) (stating that new law cannot take away vested rights, or create
new obligations or attach a new disability in respect to past transactions); Saint Vincent Hosp.
& Health Ctr., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Montana, 862 P.2d 6, 9 (Mont. 1993)
(invalidating law if it impairs vested right or creates new obligation with respect to past
transactions); OSI Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 381, 383 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) ("[A] later statute or amendment should not be applied retroactively so as to deprive a
party of its rights or impose greater liability ... .
227. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at271.
228. Id. at 266. See also Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1462 (stating that the Takings Clause
invalidates laws that abrogate vested property interests) (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)).
229. See Rivers, 511 U.S. at 298 (considering whether section 101 of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct).
230, See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 281-84; Rivers, 511 U.S. at 304.
231. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 & n.18 ("[T]he presumption against retroactive
legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.... Elementary considerations of fairness
dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their
conduct accordingly .... ").
232. See, e.g., Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 1995); National
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. City Say., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376,394 (3d Cir. 1994).
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equitable estoppel. 3 Landgraf notes that the "Due Process
Clause... protects the interests.., that may be compromised by
retroactive legislation." 4 The Landgraf opinion also recognizes that
it may be unfair for new laws to thwart legitimate expectations,
arising from a reasonable reliance on prior law."s These are elements
traditionally associated with the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 6
2. The Factual Components of Protected Legal Status
The presence or absence of protected legal status is highly fact-
specific. The example set out earlier in Part 11237 helps to demonstrate
the fact-driven nature of protected legal status, and to explain when
the above defenses to secondary retroactivity become applicable. It
was assumed that a legislative body, the Board of County
Commissioners, had initially zoned a parcel of land with a one-half
acre minimum lot size requirement in 1960. In 1997, the Board
rezoned the parcel, so there is now a two-acre minimum lot size
requirement. Between 1960 and 1997, a land developer may have
taken action that causes it to have protected legal status with respect
to the 1997 rezoning.
If the "nature" of the rezoning is to alter either a "vested right," or
a contract protected by the Contracts Clause, the developer may be
able to escape retroactive application of the 1997, rezoning. For
example, if the developer had purchased the six-acre parcel before
1997, and if the county had officially platted the parcel for twelve
lots prior to 1997, the developer may have a vested right in post-1997
continuation of the one-half acre minimum lot size rule."s On the
233. See, e.g., Simons v. City of Portland, 887 P.2d 824, 830-831 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
234. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 266. Landgraf also states that "a justification sufficient to
validate a statute's prospective application under the [Due Process] Clause 'may not suffice' to
warrant its retroactive application." Id.
235. See id. at 265,270.
236. See SiEMON, supra note 16, at 13.
237. See supra Part ll.A.
238. Compare Schenck v. City of Hudson Village, 937 F. Supp. 679, 689-91 (N.D. Ohio
1996) (holding that approval of preliminary plat accorded same status as final plat approval for
due process purposes), and Friends of the Law v. King County, 869 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1994)
(en banc) (holding that approval of preliminary plat created a vested right), with L.M. Everhart
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other hand, if the developer had only signed sales contracts with
twelve private purchasers prior to 1997, the rezoning (permitting only
three homes on the six acres) would probably be able to interfere with
these private contracts. 9 The government action in platting might
confer upon the developer a right that vests in the developer, and thus
an ability to resist retroactive changes imposed by that government.
Assume instead that prior to 1997, the county had signed an
agreement with the developer permitting the construction of twelve
homes on the six acres once the developer paid $1 million to the
county in impact fees. If the developer had paid the $1 million to the
county, the 1997 rezoning could then be viewed as the county
reneging on its own contract with the developer. The developer might
then have protected legal status under the Contracts Clause with
respect to the 1997 zoning change.240
If the "extent" of the rezoning is either to "take" an existing
property right without compensation, or impose a particular new duty
or liability on past transactions, the developer may similarly have
protected legal status with respect to the 1997 rezoning. If, prior to
Constr. v. Jefferson County Planning Comm'n, 2 F.3d 48, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
approval of subdivision plat does not create vested right). See generally Acierno v. Cloutier, 40
F.3d 597, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing different rules for vested rights in real property);
Todd v. Morgan, 109 S.E.2d 803, 804-05 (Ga. 1959) (discussing vested rights under deeds to
secure debts); Elliot v. Kesler, 799 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing vested
rights in rules of law); Burrage v. New Hampshire Police Standards & Training Council,
506 A.2d 342, 344 (N.H. 1986) (discussing vested rights in employment).
239. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 504-05 (1987)
(considering contract impairment but unless a state actor is itself a contracting party courts
should defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a measure
retroactively impairing private contracts); Mello v. Woodhouse, 872 P.2d 337 (Nev. 1994)
(discussing when rights in a contract vest).
240. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) ("[C]omplete
deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity [with regards to a state's
modification of its obligations under a contract] is not appropriate because the State's self-
interest is at stake."); Parker v. Wakelin, 937 F. Supp. 46, 57 (D. Me. 1996) (holding that a law
that retroactively impairs public contract violates Contracts Clause); McDonald's Corp. v.
Nelson, 822 F. Supp. 597, 607 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (holding that a retroactive statute impairing
license agreements violates Contracts Clause); Rothermel v. Florida Parole & Probation
Comm'n, 441 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that statutes which alter
contractual rights are within a general rule against retrospective application); Lawrence v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864, 869-70 (R.I. 1987) (stating that a legislature may enact
retrospective legislation if it does not impair contractual obligations).
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1997, the county had approved the developer's plan to build twelve
homes on the six acres, and if the developer had then expended a
great deal of money to begin the project, application of the 1997
rezoning change to the six acres might be a taking of the developer's
property.24 The likelihood that the developer would have protected
legal status because of the Takings Clause would be even greater if
the developer could prove that application of the 1997 change would
deny the developer economically viable use of the six acres,242 or
interfere with the developer's reasonable investment-backed
expectations.243
The developer might also have protected legal status if the
developer had built twelve homes prior to 1997 and the 1997 change
required the developer to pay the county $1 million in impact fees.
These fees might be charged so that the county could buy open space
elsewhere in the county to compensate for the open space lost when
the developer built twelve homes, instead of the three that would
have been permitted after 1997. The exaction of the impact fees
might trigger the Takings Clause.2' Such a requirement would
"create new obligations" based on past transactions and possibly
241. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1546,
1549-50 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that a change in development project's completion date
constituted a taking); A.A. Profiles, Inc., v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F.2d 1483, 1487-88
(11th Cir. 1988) (holding that rezoning ordinance constituted a taking); Wheeler v. City of
Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99, 100-01 (5th Cir. Unit B Dec. 1981) (finding that ordinance which
prevented plaintiffs from using their building permit constituted a taking).
242. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)
(holding that an owner who is deprived of all economically beneficial use of land is entitled to
compensation); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding that the denial of economically viable use of property as a result of regulation
constitutes a taking); Creekside Assocs., Inc. v. City of Wood Dale, 684 F. Supp. 201, 205
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that a taking occurs when legislation deprives the owner of all or an
essential use of his property).
243. See Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37,46 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
244. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct 2309, 2319-20 (1994) (requiring property
dedication as a permit condition satisfies takings analysis); City of Portsmouth v. Schlesinger,
46 F.3d 133, 137 (1st Cir. 1995) (subjecting the amount of money necessary to compensate city
for impact of increased density to takings analysis); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d
429,443-44 (Cal. 1996) (holding that takings analysis is applicable to monetary exactions).
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make the "extent" of the developer's retroactive liability sufficient to
deserve protected legal status.245
Finally, the developer has protected legal status when there is an
inadequate "degree of connection between operation of the new
[1997] rule and a relevant past event." '246 If so, it could be unfair to
apply the 1997 change to pre-enactment conduct by the developer.
Such unfairness is present when secondary retroactivity would either
violate the Due Process Clause, or permit the developer to raise
equitable estoppel against the county. The developer might be able to
raise a successful due process challenge if it can be shown that the
new two-acre minimum lot size rule either is completely irrational,
and accomplishes no legitimate goal,247 or deprives the developer of a
vested right.248 The developer could raise equitable estoppel if the
county had earlier made assurances that twelve homes could be built
on the six acres, and if the developer had detrimentally relied on
these assurances prior to 1997.249
245. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283-84 (stating that the "extent" of a party's retroactive
liability is an important legal consequence to be considered in determining whether to permit
secondary retroactivity); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 372-73 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating
that previously lawful conduct which is rendered unlawful by subsequent amendment is
protected from retroactive application); Edwards v. Edwards, 863 P.2d 513, 516 (Or. Ct. App.
1993) (stating that retroactive application would create new obligations). See also William
Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R-, 268 U.S. 633 (1925) (stating that retroactive
application of statute of limitations extension would violate due process).
246. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
247. See Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1993);
Schenck v. City of Hudson Village, 937 F. Supp. 679,690-91 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
248. See Caritas Servs., Inc. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 869 P.2d 28, 41
(Wash. 1994) (en banc) ("Due process is violated if the retroactive application of a statute
deprives an individual of a vested right.").
249. See Lincoln Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Nebraska, 963 F.2d 1136, 1141
(8th Cir. 1992) (finding equittable estoppel from mailing insurance identification card);
Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1167 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that one of the factors
for equittable estoppel is reasonable reliance); Bourne v. Tahoe Reg' Planning Agency, 829 F.
Supp. 1203, 1208-09 (D. Nev. 1993) (stating that developer's reliance on assurances of permit
by regional development agency raised valid issue of estoppel); Mortvedt v. Department of
Natural Resources, 858 P.2d 1140, 1143-1144 (Alaska 1993); State ex rel. Department of
Revenue v. Driggs, 873 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ariz. T.C. 1994) (finding reliance on forms and
instructions disseminated by the Department); Grand Haven Township v. Brummel, 274
N.W.2d 814, 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (refusing to enforce injunction to follow zoning
regulations on equittable grounds). But see S & M Inv. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 911
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B. Functional Preconditions to Protected Legal Status
There are six constitutional and equitable defenses to intentional
secondary retroactivity: (1) the Contracts Clause, (2) the vested rights
doctrine, (3) the Takings Clause, (4) restrictions on new duties or
liabilities imposed on past transactions, (5) the Due Process Clause,
and (6) the equitable estoppel doctrine. Although these six defenses
to retroactivity are usually raised separately by litigants, they are
interrelated. For example, similar elements of proof are needed to
establish vested rights and to invoke equitable estoppel. Courts often
ask identical questions in determining whether there is a vested right
or a due process violation. A Contracts Clause challenge often entails
an allegation that the new law has retroactively imposed a new duty;
a Takings Clause challenge may arise when a new law imposes a new
liability on an existing property interest. A takings lawsuit is more
likely to be successful if the property affected by the new law
constitutes a vested right. A takings claim and a due process
challenge sometimes use the same test-whether the purpose of the
retroactive law is justifiable and whether the law will in some way
bring about that purpose. Due process and estoppel are linked
because each addresses the underlying fairness of the new law.
The interrelated nature of the six traditional legal defenses to
secondarily retroactive laws suggests that there may be little
difference between them. When viewed functionally, a successful
assertion of a particular legal defense to retroactivity depends less on
the choice of a specific defense and more on the existence of the
following factual variables: (1) a protectable legal interest, often in
the form of a property right; (2) an earlier promise by a governmental
entity; (3) reasonable reliance on the promise resulting in a legitimate
expectation by a private party; (4) some injury to that party; and (5)
the absence of a suitable justification or explanation for the
governmental decision to proceed retroactively. These factual
variables, in effect, have become the functional pre-conditions to
F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding no estoppel against the government absent "pervasive
pattern of false promises").
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protected legal status. A critical inquiry for secondarily retroactive
legislation is how many of these conditions are present in a given
factual context."0
1. Protectable Legal Interest
The initial inquiry for a legal defense to retroactivity is usually
whether the private party affected by the retroactivity has some legal
interest that existed and was legally protected prior to the new
legislation. If such an interest is present, then (1) the Takings and
Due Process clauses become applicable if the interest is "private
property,"25' (2) the Contracts Clause is relevant if the interest is
contractual, z 2 and (3) the vested rights doctrine may be advanced if
250. While not all of these preconditions must be provable to assure protected legal status,
the more that can the greater the likelihood that a court will refuse to apply legislation
retroactively.
251. For cases involving property interests and the Takings Clause, compare Ruckelshaus
v Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-05 (1984) (trade secrets are "property" protectable by the
Takings Clause), United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75-78 (1982)
(nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens are "property"), Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602 (1935) (mortgages are "property"), Lynch v. United States, 292
U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (valid contracts are "property"), and Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d
933, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (leases are "property"), with Pittman v. Chicago Board of Education,
64 F.3d 1098, 1104 (7th Cir. 1995) (no property in job tenure), Longshore v. United States, 77
F.3d 440,443 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (no property in right to participate in federal lottery for a cellular
radio license), Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (no property in
a rule of common law), and M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (no property right to mine in such a way as to endanger public health and safety).
For cases involving property interests and the Due Process Clause, compare Walz v. Town
of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1995) (entitlement to excavation permit from town is
"property" subject to due process protection), and Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Taft, 951
F.2d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 1991) (liquor license is "property"), with Federal Housing Partners IV
v. Cisneros, 55 F.3d 362, 367-68 (8th Cir. 1995) (no property in rental adjustments), and Sylvia
Development Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 826 (4th Cir. 1995) (no property in
acquisition of special zoning designation).
252. Compare In re Workers' Compensation Refund W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 813,
818 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that a contract exists that is subject to the Contracts Clause when a
relationship allocates rights and responsibilities among parties), and Holiday Inns Franchising,
Inc. v. Branstad, 29 F.3d 383, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that franchise agreements are
contracts protected by the Contracts Clause), with Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531
(1982) (stating that a statute cannot impair a contract that did not exist at the time of its
enactment), General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 189 (1992) (holding that the
Contracts Clause only applies to state actions that "impair the obligation of pre-existing
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the right has vested. 3 Successful assertion of these defenses protects
legal interests from retroactively-applying changes. 4
contracts") (emphasis added), Kestler v. Board of Trustees, 48 F.3d 800, 803-04 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding no contract before rights vest in a retirement scheme), and Aves v. Shah, 914 F. Supp.
443, 447 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that the Contracts Clause does not apply to a contract that
does not precede the challenging legislation).
253. A vested right is a right that has so definitively accrued that it is not subject to defeat
by a subsequent legislative act. See Blue Chip Properties v. Permanent Rent Control Bd. of
Santa Monica, 216 Cal. Rptr. 492, 497 (Cal. Ct App. 1985); Caritas Servs, 869 P.2d at 41
(something more than a mere expectation). A vested right may be based in specific state
constitutional provisions that prevent vested rights from being impaired retroactively, see
People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326, 1334 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (Kirshbaum, J., concurring), or
in the Due Process Clauses, see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 892 P.2d 497, 506-07
(Kan. 1995).
No one has a vested right in the hope that a law will not change, or that private property
will be free from subsequent government interference. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978) (finding no vested interest in any rule of
common law); Smart v. Dane County Bd. of Adjustments, 501 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Wis. 1993). A
vested right must also be something more than a mere unilateral expectation. See Phillips v.
Curiale, 608 A.2d 895, 901-02 (N.J. 1992); Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Government v.
Washington State Boundary Review Bd., 903 P.2d 953, 958 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
254. For cases involving the Takings Clause, see Dolan v. City ofTigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994) (city dedication requirement constitutes a taking); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1993) (state law preventing building on lots purchased prior to the
law's passage is taking); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (federal law
requiring disclosure of pre-existing trade-secret data may be a taking of the property interest in
the data); Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (federal law restricting rights
to presidential papers is a taking); United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (federal refusal to approve mining plan is a taking); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (order prohibiting construction on wetlands
constituted a taking); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (Fed. Cl. 1994) (denial of federal
permit a taking); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 411 (Fed. Cl. 1994)
(federal reclamation law prohibiting mining in certain areas is a taking); Rybachek v. United
States, 23 Cf. CL 222 (Cl. Ct. 1991) (Clean Water Act regulations governing discharges from
gold placer mining site may be a taking); Healing v. California Coastal Commission, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (delay in building permit approval may constitute a taking);
Board of County Commissioners of Saguache v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1984)
(governmental interference that substantially interferes with use and possession of property is a
taking); SeawallAssociates v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989) (law requiring
owners to accept occupation of rental property by persons not already in residence is a taking).
For cases involving the Contracts Clause, see United States Trust, 431 U.S. I (covenant
between New Jersey and New York cannot be repealed in violation of the Contracts Clause);
Educational Employees Credit Union v. Mutual Guaranty Corp., 50 F.3d 1432 (8th Cir. 1995)
(unconstitutional retroactive alteration of contractual duty regarding capital contributions to
credit union); Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (city eviction control
legislation violated Contracts Clause); State v. Leavins, 599 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (statute outlawing any mechanical dredge for purpose of taking oysters impaired contract
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Private parties should be cautioned that not all legal interests are
property,2" nor are all property rights (including contract rights)
protectable.2 To have a protectable legal interest, especially if such
an interest is claimed to be a property interest, the private party must
have either a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, or ownership of
it.257 To resist a retroactive change in applicable statutory law, a
private party will typically claim a pre-enactment property
nghts under perpetual oyster harvesting leases); Ohio Ass'n of County Board of Mental
Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Public Employees Retirement System, 585 N.E.2d
597 (Ohio CL Common Pleas 1990) (unconstitutional retroactive impairment of retirement
contract); Association of Pennsylvania State College & University Faculties v. State System of
Higher Education, 479 A.2d 962 (Pa. 1984) (retroactive impairment of retirement contract);
Caritas Services, Inc. v Department of Social & Health Services, 869 P.2d 28 (Wash. 1994) (en
banc) (retroactive amendments impaired contracts between state agency and nursing homes).
For cases involving the Due Process Clause, see Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162
(2d Cir. 1995) (due process violated when property owner compelled to dedicate land in order
to obtain utility service); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 830 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1992) (en bane)
(ordinance requiring landowners to pay fee or replace rental units before removing or
demolishing them violated due process); Cox v. City of Lynnwood, 863 P.2d 578 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (denial of application of boundary line adjustment violated due process).
255. See, e.g., Norton v. Village of Corrales, 103 F.3d 928, 931-32 (10th Cir. 1996) (no
property interest in plat approval during time of submission); Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48
F.3d 674, 680-81 (2d Cir. 1995) (no protectable property interest in insulation inspection);
Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1989) (not all property interests worthy of
procedural due process protection are also protected by substantive due process); B-West
Imports, Inc. v. United States, 75 F.3d 633, 638 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (interest in import permits not
sufficient property right to prohibit government from revoking them without paying just
compensation); Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County v. United States, 48
F.3d 520, 524-26 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (interests held by county as a result of a proffer by a
developer to perform certain activities in order to obtain zoning approval were not protectable
legal interests).
256. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 638-41 ("Contracts may create rights of property, but
when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a
congenital infirmity"); R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 733 (retroactive federal economic
legislation can affect contracts); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114, 1125 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit Congress from imposing obligations on
employers beyond those voluntarily assumed by contract); Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs
of Jay County, 57 F.3d 505, 508-10 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that legislation that adversely
affects contracts is not necessarily a taking); Linan-Faye Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth. of
Camden, 49 F.3d 915, 931-32 (3d. Cir. 1995) (noting that not every contract gives rise to a
protectable property interest).
257. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Mid-American Waste Sys.,
Inc., v. City of Gary, 49 F.3d 286, 290 (7th Cir. 1995); DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment
for the Township of West Amwell, 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1995).
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entitlement to a right that was sought (e.g., an approval by a
government body of an application) 1 8 or already existed (e.g., a
previously granted building permit) 9 prior to the legislative change.
2. Government Promises
A government guarantee or assurance may create a legal interest
that is protected against secondary retroactive application of a new
law. A promise by some government actor about the continued
applicability of existing law may prevent the later application of
retroactive law. The promise is critical to the success of a vested
258. As a general rule, private parties do not have protectable property interests in
government actions if the government has discretion to deny the request. See, e.g., Crowley v.
Courville, 76 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1996); Triomphe Investors v. City of Northwood, 49 F.3d
198, 203 (6th Cir. 1995) (no property interest in approval of a permit); Sylvia Dev. Corp, v.
Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 826 (4th Cir. 1995) (no property interest in an application for a
Transfer Zone District classification).
When the discretion of the government body is so narrowly circumscribed that approval of
an application is virtually assured, then a party may have a protectable property interest in
approval of an application. See Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162, 168-69 (2d Cir.
1995) (finding that homeowners possessed entitlement to excavation permit that constituted
property right protected by due process).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 71, 81 (1982) (holding
that a lien perfected before the law was enacted cannot be retroactively taken in the absence of
clear congressional intent); Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17 F.3d 1374, 1379-80
(11th Cir. 1994) (finding that developer has a vested property interest in a building permit it
possessed); Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (presidential papers
are protected property, and therefore the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act
may not restrict former President Nixon's rights to his papers); Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v.
City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that developer has a
property interest in existing zoning classification after city assured developer that property
would not be subject to zoning change and developer engaged in substantial acts in reliance);
A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F.2d 1483, 1488 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that
original development approval of a wood-chipping operation granted plaintiff a property
interest protected from subsequent rezoning); Blumberg v. Pinellas County, 836 F. Supp. 839,
844-45 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that utility customers have property interests in deposits and
in the interest generated); CABO Distrib. Co. v. Brady, 821 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(holding that distributor had "property interest" in certificate of label approval issued by the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, sufficient to enjoin the Bureau's subsequent
revocation of the certificate); S & R Properties v. Maricopa County, 875 P.2d 150, 157-58
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a right to a tax refund is a substantive right that vests upon
pre-amendment verification of erroneous property tax assessment); United Artists Theater
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6, 11-13 (Pa. 1991) (a theater building is
protected property that cannot be taken from the owner by a historic preservation law).
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rights,260 estoppel,2 6 ' or Contracts Clause claim . 62  The Takings
Clause is also more likely to be implicated if what has been
260. To trigger the vested rights doctrine, the government promise must be for a benefit to
which the promisee is otherwise entitled. See Dyce v. Salaried Employees' Pension Plan of
Allied Corp., 15 F.3d 163, 166 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (stating that because participants would not
otherwise be entitled to benefits, the amendment may be applied retroactively). A unilateral
expectation on the part of the party claiming a retroactive impairment of a vested right, such as
where the government has discretion to deny or modify the interest affected by the changed law,
is not sufficient. See Triomphe Investors, 49 F.3d at 203. Nor does a contract necessarily create
a protectable promise; a contract with a government entity is only vested when there is some
governmental intent to create an enforceable contractual right. See Mid-American Waste, 49
F.3d at 289-90. The critical component of a government promise is the extent to which a
government entity has in some way encouraged, induced, or approved private action, and
thereby promised the private party a right vested against retroactive change. See Reserve Ltd.,
17 F.3d at 1381 (vested right in permit after large sums expended in reliance on it); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Conner, 871 F. Supp. 1424, 1426-27 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (state statute improperly
took away vested right created by common law to assert claims against bank officials for breach
of duties); In re Persky, 134 B.R. 81, 91-92 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (retroactive application of
statutes affecting vested rights is disfavored); Cline v. City of Boulder, 450 P.2d 335, 338
(Colo. 1969) (a right is vested when an individual has taken steps in substantial reliance upon
an act of a governmental entity); WMM Properties v. Cobb County, 339 S.E.2d 252, 255 (Ga.
1986); Lake Shore Estates, Inc. v. Denville Township Planning Bd., 605 A.2d 1106, 1111 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); see also Friends of the Law v. King County, 869 P.2d 1056, 1060
(Wash. 1994) (en banc) (application for plat approval a vested right); Erickson & Assocs., Inc.
v. McLerran, 849 P.2d 688, 690-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Burch v. Monroe, 834 P.2d 33, 35
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (vested right in default judgment which placed lien on property). But see
L.M. Everhart Const., Inc. v. Jefferson County Planning Comm., 2 F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that conditional approval of a subdivision plat does not create vested property right to
develop subdivision as approved).
261. Government agencies are subject to estoppel if they have made some promise that an
earlier rule will control private conduct. The promise can take the form of representations,
assurances, instructions, or even public statements by government officials. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Nelson v. Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 834 F. Supp. 1205,
1214 (D. Neb. 1993) (public statements); Bourne v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 829 F.
Supp. 1203, 1209 (D. Nev. 1993) (assurances and representations); State ex rel. Department of
Revenue v. Driggs, 873 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ariz. T.C. 1994) (instructions); Florida Dep't of
Transp. v. Dardashti Properties, 605 So. 2d 120, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(representations); Hagee v. City of Evanston, 414 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(representations).
Some jurisdictions require that the promise must rise to a certain level of culpability, which
is most easily demonstrated if the promisor (i.e., the government official) had actual or imputed
knowledge of the false nature of the promise, making the representation a misrepresentation.
See. e.g., City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 444-45 (Cal. 1970) (in bank); Miller v.
State Employes' Retirement Sys., 626 A.2d 679, 682 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
262. Private parties may be able to resist retroactive changes to contract terms between
private parties if the new law's retroactive effect on the contractual promises is not limited in
any way (e.g., the law does not contemplate gradual applicability, with grace periods). When a
19971
Washington University Open Scholarship
152 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
unconstitutionally affected by a new law is a legal interest arising as a
result of some government assurance.
263
3. Reliance
Reasonable reliance on existing law is important for the successful
assertion of a (1) takings claim (which may turn on whether the
retroactive law interferes with an investment-backed expectation),2 4
law is not limited, its effect on the promises made by the private parties may be characterized as
a "sudden, totally unanticipated, and substantial retroactive obligation." Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 249 (1978). A new law which is "substantially retroactive" is
one which impairs existing contracts immediately upon its effective date, and which provides
no relief to the parties whose contractual right have been abridged in the future. See First Nat'l
Bank of Pennsylvania v. Flanagan, 528 A.2d 134, 137-38 (Pa. 1987).
An impairment might also be substantial if application of the new law works a change in
the remedies under a contract, thereby converting an otherwise enforceable agreement into a
"mere promise," and impairing the contract's obligatory force. See Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S.
(1 How.) 311, 316-17 (1843); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197-98
(1819). Some jurisdictions presume a substantial impairment if retroactive application of the
new law adds a new and unforeseen obligation or duty to the parties' promises in a contract.
See, e.g., Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Fiat Motors of N. Am., 794 F.2d 213, 215-16 (6th Cir.
1984); Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 331 N.W.2d 456, 463 (Mich. 1982). If the
impairment is substantial, protected legal status will not be denied simply because a state is
exercising its otherwise legitimate police powers. See, e.g., Educational Employees Credit
Union v. Mutual Guar. Corp., 50 F.3d 1432, 1438 (8th Cir. 1995).
263. When the government retroactively denies a property owner the benefits of official
promises, there may be a taking. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011
(1984) (promise of confidentiality); A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F.2d 1483
(11th Cir. 1988) (zoning resolution approving development); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant
Grove, 664 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. Unit B. Dec. 1981) (building permit).
A court may also find a taking ifa retroactive law has interfered with "distinct investment-
backed expectations." See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 864 F. Supp. 917, 926-27 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
An owner of property not only has a protectable expectation, but one which is considered
"distinct," if the government has explicitly promised that it will not be retroactively impaired by
subsequent law. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011 (federal government explicitly guaranteed
an extensive measure of confidentiality and exclusive use of trade secret data).
264. A legally protected expectation exists when a property owner can show that a private
decision about the property occurred in the past, in reliance on a state of affairs that did not
include the possibility of a new, retroactively-applied law. When it is not reasonably
foreseeable that there might be a change in the law, then there is an expectation protected by the
Takings Clause against retroactive interference. See Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 633-
34 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177-78 (Fed. Cir.
1994); United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Bowles v.
United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 50-52 (Fed. Cl. 1994); NRG Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 51,
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(2) due process claim (which considers the fairness of changing the
rules on someone who has relied on a previous set of rules),265 or (3)
Contracts Clause claim (which assumes that parties to a contract rely
on the fact that the terms of the contract will not change).26
Detrimental reliance often is influential in determining whether an
expectation thwarted by a retroactive law rises to the level of a
protected vested right.' If a party did not assume the risk of a future
change of law, and if the possibility of change was unforeseeable, it
may be impermissible for a new duty or an unexpected liability to
affect reliance interests.2' Also, one of the traditional elements of
equitable estoppel is reliance.2'
62 (Cl. Ct. 1991).
265. When a private party has reasonably relied on past assurances by a government body
that the applicable law will not be changed in the future to adversely affect past private actions,
due process can prevent a new law from applying to the party. See Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1549 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
266. A Contracts Clause violation is more likely when legislation thwarts the contracting
parties' reasonable reliance on the terms of an existing contract. See Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 242-
44, 246; United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 20-21 n.17, 25; Whirlpool Corp. v. Ritter, 929 F.2d
1318, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 576 (Okla. Ct. App.
1994). If retroactive legislation addresses a topic never before reached by regulation, then
reliance interests are legitimate and parties may successfully raise the Contracts Clause. See
West End Tenants Ass'n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718, 734-35 (D.C. 1994).
267. See Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Boulder, 772 F. Supp. 1178,
1180 (D. Colo. 1991); Heikes v. Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349, 1356-57 (Cal. 1995); Pioneer Trust &
Say. Bank v. County of Cook, 377 N.E.2d 21, 26 (Ill. 1978); County of Kendall v. Aurora Nat'l
Bank Trust No. 1107, 579 N.E.2d 1283, 1289 (111. App. Ct. 1991); Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of
Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 390, 397 (Neb. 1994).
In determining whether a law may apply retroactively, it is often better not to focus on
whether the right held is "vested," but rather, on whether the law surprises persons who have
long relied on a contrary state of the law. If there has been such reliance, the term "vested right"
may be only a shorthand description of a judicial determination that a law-making body should
not retroactively alter past private action. See Ray H. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on
Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 N.W. U. L. REV. 540, 561 (1956). See also Ficarra v.
Department of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 16-17 (Colo. 1993) (en bane); Incorporated
Village of Northport v. Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 384 N.Y.S.2d 923, 928 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1976); Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864, 870 (R.I. 1987); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n of Texas, 615 S.W.2d 947, 956-57 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981).
268. Some jurisdictions are reluctant to apply statutes retroactively when the new duty or
liability would significantly impair existing substantive rights, and disappoint legitimate
reliance interests. See McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Massachusetts, 989 F.2d 13, 15 (Ist Cir.
1993). In other jurisdictions it is thought to be either unconstitutional or illegal to impose
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4. Harm
An estoppel action requires reliance that produces some detriment
or injury.' Protected legal status usually requires a party affected by
unexpected future obligations or penalties on past occurrences. See Lieberman-Sack v. Harvard
Community Health Plan of New England, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 249, 255-56 (D.R.I. 1995);
Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel v. Public Serv. Co. of Colorado, 877 P.2d 867, 870
(Colo. 1994) (cannot retroactively raise rates paid by ratepayers); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995); OSI Indus. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d
381, 383 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (a later statute or amendment should not be applied retroactively
to impose a greater liability on a private party); see also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.,
24 F.3d 1565, 1577-78 (9th Cir. 1994) (new private cause of action which imposes liability on
private parties should not be retroactive); Rodriguez v. General Motors Corp., 27 F.3d 396,
398-99 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).
Conversely, when property owners are on constructive notice that new obligations may be
imposed by Congress, there is no constitutional impediment to such retroactive legislation. See
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986); Student Loan Mktg.
Ass'n v. Riley, 907 F. Supp. 464,470 (D.D.C. 1995).
269. See Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59-
60 (1984) (estoppel against the government may be asserted when there is official affirmative
misconduct, upon which a private party has detrimentally relied); Dion v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 823 F.2d 669, 673 (1st Cir. 1987) (a private party "should not suffer for an
agency's delays and errors"); Decarion v. Monroe County, 853 F. Supp. 1415, 1419 (S.D. Fla.
1994) (state estopped from depriving property owner of building permit); Hy Kom Dev. Co, v.
Manatee County, 837 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (county estopped from declaring permit
invalid after developer had obtained the permit and expended $2.5 million in reliance on it);
State ex rel. Department of Revenue v. Driggs, 873 P.2d 1311 (Ariz. T.C. 1994) (state estopped
from collecting additional tax assessment when state forms were incorrect); see also Jafay v.
Board of County Comm'rs of Boulder County, 848 P.2d 892, 903 (Colo. 1993); lazzetti v.
Village of Tuxedo Park, 546 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Department of
Commerce v. Casey, 624 A.2d 247, 253-54 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); State ex rel. Wyoming
Workers Compensation Div. v. Rivera, 796 P.2d 447,450 (Wyo. 1990).
For purposes of equitable estoppel, an act of reliance typically entails the expenditures of
money or the incurrence of an obligation. See, e.g., Equity Resources, Inc. v. County of Leon,
643 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Hagee v. City of Evanston, 414 N.E.2d 1184,
1187 (II1. App. Ct. 1980); El Dorado at Santa Fe, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Sante Fe
County, 551 P.2d 1360, 1366-67 (N.M. 1976). Reliance is reasonable and in good faith if there
was no convenient way for the private party to ascertain that the government representation was
unreliable or false. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1550
(11 th Cir. 1994); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423,42-44 (Cal. 1970) (in bank).
270. A condition to a successful equitable estoppel action is injury resulting from a
government representation or promise. This condition is met when the private party has made
such a substantial change in position, incurred such extensive obligations, or made such
significant expenditures that it would be unfair to retroactively alter or destroy the benefits
acquired under the earlier promise. See Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17 F.3d 1374,
1380 (11th Cir. 1994); Simons v. City of Portland, 887 P.2d 824, 831 (Or. Ct. App. 1994);
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secondary retroactivity to demonstrate some harm or injury resulting
from the new law. Both vested rights and contracts are presumptively
protected if they are "impaired."271 There may be an unconstitutional
taking if a property right has been physically invaded," singled out
for restrictive regulation,273 or subject to the loss of economically
Kramarevcky v. Department of Soc. Servs., 863 P.2d 535, 549-51 (Wash. 1993) (en bane)
(Madsen, J., dissenting).
271. If one has a vested right, a new law which is secondarily retroactive may not be
applied so as to impair the right or deprive the holder of it. See Estate of Ridenour v.
Commissioner, 36 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1994); Pardee Constr. Co. v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 157 Cal. Rptr. 184, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (amendment would destroy vested
rights); Griffin v. City of N. Chicago, 445 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Saint Vincent
Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Montana, 862 P.2d 6, 9 (Mont. 1993) (finding that statute
would impair vested ights).
The text of the Contracts Clause in Article I, Section 10 provides that the Clause's
protection is triggered when a contract is "impaired." A contract is impaired by a statute which
alters its terms, imposes new conditions, or lessens its value. See Federated Am. Ins. Co. v.
Marquardt, 741 P.2d 18, 23-24 (Wash. 1987).
The Supreme Court has established that a "threshold inquiry is 'whether the state law has
operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship."' Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) (quoting Spannaus, 438
U.S. at 244). See also United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 17. The severity of the impairment
increases the level of scrutiny to which retroactive legislation is subjected. See Spannaus, 438
U.S. at 245. Substantial impairment occurs when legitimate reliance interests and expectations
are defeated by the new law. See Association of Surrogates v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 772 (2d
Cir. 1991); Nevada Employees Ass'n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1990); Haley v.
Pataki, 883 F. Supp. 816, 825 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Arriaga v. Members of the Bd. of Regents, 825
F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Mass. 1992); Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), 609 A.2d 1204, 1210 (N.H.
1992) (per curiam); Peppers v. Beier, 599 N.E.2d 793, 795 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
272. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982);
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Madison County Drainage Bd., 898 F. Supp. 1302, 1311 (S.D.
Ind. 1995); GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Public Utility Comm'n, 900 P.2d 495, 503 (Or. 1995) (in
bank); Hoover v. Pierce County, 903 P.2d 464, 469 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
273. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960); Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 1994);
Blumberg v. Pinellas County, 836 F. Supp. 839, 845-46 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Aspen-Tarpon
Springs Ltd. Partnership v. Stuart, 635 So. 2d 61, 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Manocherian v.
Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 N.Y.2d 385, 394 (N.Y. 1994); see also Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269,
278-79 (1898) ("[T]he exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of a public
improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of
such excess, a taking. .. .
This judicial aversion to retroactive laws which have "singled out" particular property
owners also extends to government actions that deny only one owner use of its property in order
to capitulate to the unreasonable fears of the surrounding community. See Cardon Oil Co. v.
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viable use.274 A successful due process challenge often entails an
allegation that the effect of the new law is "oppressive."275
5. Rationality
Finally, a retroactive law is constitutionally suspect if it fails to
meet the test of essential rationality. This test is simply a requirement
that the new law have a valid purpose, and that the choice to apply its
terms retroactively be consistent with this purpose. A retroactive law
that impairs a contract may be void under the Contracts Clause if it is
City of Phoenix, 593 P.2d 656, 659 (Ariz. 1979); Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 515
N.W.2d 401,408 (Neb. 1994).
274. One common consequence of secondary retroactivity is a reduction of the economic
value of existing property affected by the new law. The Supreme Court has confirmed that there
may be a taking of property (giving property protected legal status under the Takings Clause)
after a reviewing court considers (1) the "economic impact of the [new] regulation," Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124, and (2) the new law's likelihood of denying the owner "economically
viable use of this land," Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). There may be no
predictable difference between an adverse economic impact and a denial of economically viable
use. What is certain is that there is a categorical taking (and protected legal status) when the
new law has the effect of depriving the owner of all future worth, value, or economically
beneficial use of property not otherwise characterized as a nuisance under state law. See Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1015-16; New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 856 F. Supp. 659, 662 (S.D. Fla.
1994); Healing v. California Coastal Comm'n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
Peterman v. Department of Natural Resources, 521 N.W.2d 499,506-07 (Mich. 1994).
Even in the absence of a total taking, it may be unconstitutional for a retroactive law to
deny the owner the right to economically exploit the land-to sell it for the best price available
in the market. See Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Creppel v.
United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
275. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938); Priddy v. City of Tulsa, 882 P.2d 81,
84 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Rivett v. City of Tacoma, 870 P.2d 299, 303 (Wash. 1994) (en
banc). Laws tend to be characterized as oppressive or burdensome if their retroactive
application will deprive a person of(1) a legal interest, such as a vested right, (2) an entitlement
to a particular government action, or (3) a private property interest which is specially protected
by the Due Process Clause. See Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162, 168-69 (2d Cir.
1995) (state-created property right); National Union Fire Ins. v. City Say., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376,
394 (3d Cir. 1994) (right to raise defenses and affirmative defenses); HBP Assocs. v. Marsh,
893 F. Supp. 271,279 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (property interest in a government service); Garcia v. La
Farge, 893 P.2d 428, 437 (N.M. 1995) (imposition of an unreasonably short statue of limitations
period); Schirmer v. Homestake Mining Co., 882 P.2d 11, 14 (N.M. 1994); Caritas Servs., 869
P.2d at 41 (vested right). The rationale behind this component of due process is that movement
should respect certain settled expectations, and that holders of vested or protectable property
rights should be secure against governmental disruption.
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not justified by a legitimate state interest.276 If a retroactive law does
not substantially advance a legitimate state interest it may constitute a
taking.27  A retroactive law may also violate due process if it is
arbitrary,278 or if it cannot accomplish the government's goal.279
276. A retroactive law that impairs private contracts is void under the Contracts Clause if it
is not justified by a significant and legitimate public purpose, such as the remedying of a
general social or economic problem. If the State is unable to articulate an urgent social need for
the new law, or if its intent is to create a windfall for one private group at the expense of
another, or if it retroactively redistributes assets to benefit only a selected few, then the private
contract affected by the new law is more likely to have protected legal status. See In re
Workers' Compensation Refund W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 813, 818-19 (8th Cir. 1995)
(stating that goal illegitimate if achieved by retroactive means); Earthworks Contracting, Ltd. v.
Mendel-Allison Constr. of California, Inc., 804 P.2d 831, 837-38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
Similarly, if the impairment is not reasonably necessary to solve some general societal
problems, but is instead designed to promote a more profitable private use of property, there
may be a Contracts Clause violation. See Puls v. James, 302 N.E.2d 768, 774-75 (Ind. 1973);
Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 464-65 (Ind. CL App. 1987).
277. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. CL 2309, 2316 (1994); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 889 F. Supp. 818, 827-29 (W.D.
Pa. 1995).
Courts are suspicious of laws that burden an owner's existing property rights with the
purpose of pressing the private property into some kind of public service. The troublesome fact
is that private property is being singled out for a burden and the beneficiaries of the burden are
persons not otherwise sharing in the burden. Such retroactive laws unfairly distribute the
practical negative consequences of a new law by producing a future effect which is experienced
disproportionately by targeted property owners. This kind of law does not further a legitimate
state interest (and is a taking) when the affected property owners have been "force[d] alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See also Creppel v. United States,
41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
278. A retroactive law is "arbitrary" if there is absolutely no evidence to justify imposition
of a new rule, or no reason whatsoever for the decision to proceed retroactively. See United
States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 & n.14 (1946) (stating that an arbitrary decision is one
"without adequate determining principle or [is] unreasoned"); Shelton v. City of College
Station, 780 F.2d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that a law is arbitrary if "the government
could have no legitimate reason for its decision"); Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205,
216 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that a law is arbitrary when government acts with indefensible
reason); Adamson Cos. v. City of Malibu, 854 F. Supp. 1476, 1491 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding a
law arbitrary when no evidence to justify law); Hixon v. Walker County, 468 S.E.2d 744 (Ga.
1996) (stating that a law is arbitrary if no standards guide discretion).
279. See Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692-94 (3d Cir. 1993);
National Educ. Ass'n-Rhode Island v. Retirement Bd. of Rhode Island Employees'
Retirement Sys., 890 F. Supp. 1143, 1165 (D.RLI. 1995); Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of
Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625-26 (Fla. 1990); Upper Deerfield Township v. Seabrook Hous.
Corp., 605 A.2d 1160, 1163 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); Cox v. City of Lynnwood, 863
P.2d 578, 583 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
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CONCLUSION
Courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and other lawmakers
must change applicable law from time to time. A change may be
thought necessary because of differing social and economic contexts,
a rethinking of the continued usefulness or fairness of the old law, or
a realization that the old law had caused unanticipated negative
consequences. Whatever the reason for the change, one central issue
inevitably associated with the change is whether it should apply to or
otherwise affect persons whose pre-change conduct has been
influenced by the old law, or whether it should apply only to conduct
arising after the change. This is the problem of retroactivity.
Analysis of the problem begins with an understanding of the
important difference between primary and secondary retroactivity.
When a legislature enacts a substantive statute which is an example
of true secondary retroactivity, three questions follow:
(1) Has the legislature intended the statute to apply
retroactively? (2) If not, should the statute be presumed to
apply retroactively? (3) Regardless of legislative wishes, may
the statute apply retroactively?
The third issue is often resolved by determining whether the
private actions subject to the new statute have achieved protected
legal status.
The study of retroactivity has been neglected too long. The
Supreme Court has focused considerable attention on the topic,280 and
in so doing has raised the possibility that private property owners
adversely affected by new law may raise defenses of impermissible
retroactivity to prevent application of the new law. Retroactivity is an
alternative way of thinking about how laws may harm private
expectations and individual action taken in good faith reliance on a
On the other hand, the requirements of due process are satisfied if retroactive application of
new legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See R. A. Gray & Co.,
467 U.S. at 729-30; Usery, 428 U.S. at 15-18; Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 236 (6th Cir.
1996).
280. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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continuation of previous law. For parties accustomed to losing
takings or due process challenges to government action, an argument
concentrating on the essential unfairness of the action's retroactivity
may be more effective in protecting private interests otherwise
injured by changes in law.
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